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COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT:  A 
DEFENSE OF MINIMUM FEDERAL STANDARDS 
DOUGLAS R. WILLIAMS* 
In 1990, ambient air quality in over 100 American cities fell short of 
health-based standards established pursuant to the Clean Air Act, known as 
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS).1  In population terms, more 
than 112 million Americans were breathing air that posed significant risks to 
their health.2  The villain in this pollution story is ground level ozone. 
In the ten years since these dim statistics were brought to public attention 
and Congress amended the Clean Air Act to address the problem, many urban 
areas have made modest progress in reducing ambient concentrations of ozone.  
During this period, the number of areas officially considered to be in 
“nonattainment” of the ozone NAAQS declined from 101 to 34.3  Nonetheless, 
nearly 50 million people live in areas that still do not meet the ozone NAAQS.4 
With a bit of luck, many of the areas in which ambient ozone levels 
currently exceed the NAAQS may attain the ozone standard sometime before 
2005, although that prospect is fraught with uncertainty.5  But if this may be 
 
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  My thanks to Jeff Lewis for his 
encouragement and support, to Connie Wagner for her patience, and to Amy Hoch and Ryan K. 
Manger for their unflagging efforts in support of the symposium. 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a). 
 2. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-490, 101st Cong. 146 (1990), reprinted in COMMITTEE ON 
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, U.S. SENATE, II A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN 
AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 3170 (1993).  Because of variances in ozone concentrations 
within areas, it is likely that the number of persons actually exposed to unhealthy levels of ozone 
is somewhat less than the figure cited in the text.  Nonetheless, “ozone . . . is . . . the pollutant 
most likely to have fairly uniform concentrations throughout an area.”  Id. at 3219. 
 3. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GREEN BOOK HOME PAGE, 
CLASSIFICATION OF OZONE NONATTAINMENT AREAS, at http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/greenbk/ 
onc.html (last visited March 1, 2001) [hereinafter GREEN BOOK]. 
 4. See GAO, Status of Implementation and Issues of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990, GAO/RCED 00-72, at p. 9 (2000); ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL 
AIR QUALITY AND EMISSIONS TRENDS REPORT 36 (2000) [hereinafter TRENDS REPORT]. 
 5. This prediction is based on the effects of EPA’s finding that many states contribute 
significantly to nonattainment of the ozone standards in downwind states and its requirement that 
these upwind states reduce their emissions of nitrogen oxides, which contribute to the formation 
of ozone in downwind areas.  See Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 
69 U.S.L.W. 3297 (U.S. March 5, 2001) (No. 00-632). 
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regarded as a bit of good news, there is some devastating bad news: the 
existing ozone NAAQS is not adequate to protect public health.6  Thus, even 
persons living in areas currently deemed to be in attainment of the ozone 
NAAQS may be breathing air that poses a significant risk to their health.  The 
existing ozone NAAQS is set at .12 parts per million (ppm), averaged over a 
one-hour period.7  In 1997, EPA revised the standard downward to .08 ppm, 
averaged over an eight-hour period.  Although the new standard remains under 
a legal cloud,8 its primary legal difficulties do not relate to the conclusion that 
exposures to ozone in concentrations of less than .12 ppm (the existing 
standard) pose considerable health risks to citizens, but rather concern how 
much lower than .12 ppm the standard should be set and what sort of 
explanation the courts will demand of EPA in justification of the standard.9  
Thus, from a public health perspective, air quality is far poorer than is 
currently and officially recognized.  Approximately 120 million people now 
live in areas that currently fail to meet the revised, .08 ppm standard.10  
Additionally, eight-hour ozone concentrations in 25 national parks and rural 
sites increased during the 1990’s, posing threats to agricultural productivity 
and ecosystem health.11  Even assuming that the new eight-hour standard will 
eventually be implemented, it is likely to be many more years before that 
standard is widely attained.  Thus, almost ten years after the passage of the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAA), one might very well conclude 
that, despite considerable efforts, tens of millions of Americans and the 
generations to follow them are fated to breathe unhealthy air. 
The extent of continuing ozone nonattainment is troublesome, and not only 
because of the associated health risks.  In 1990, Congress legislated 
aggressively to attack the ozone problem, imposing strict requirements on 
ozone nonattainment areas.12  It was anticipated that, once implemented, these 
 
 6. See generally EPA, National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 2 
(July 18, 1997). 
 7. 40 C.F.R. § 50.9. 
 8. See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001). 
 9. The D.C. Circuit had concluded that EPA’s explanation for the new ozone standard 
violated the nondelegation doctrine because the agency had failed to identify a decisional 
standard that sufficiently constrained the agency’s discretion.  American Trucking Ass’n., Inc. v. 
EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (1999).  The Supreme Court recently reversed this holding and sent 
the case back to the D.C. Circuit for further review.  Whitman, 121 S. Ct. at 919. 
 10. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, LATEST FINDINGS ON NATIONAL AIR 
QUALITY: 1999 STATUS AND TRENDS, at 5 (2000). 
 11. Id. at 8. 
 12. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7511a.  Several scholars have attacked the requirements of 1990 
amendments as too stringent.  See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and 
the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 
Symposium Issue, found and bound in 14 YALE J. REG. 23, 58 (1996) (describing costs of 1990 
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requirements would bring most (but not all) areas into attainment before the 
beginning of the new millennium.13  It is now clear that Congress 
underestimated the difficulties of putting effective pollution control measures 
in place, just as it had in 1970 and again in 1977, when it amended existing 
legislation to address persistent air pollution problems like ozone.14 
This state of affairs focuses critical attention on existing institutional 
arrangements for handling air quality problems generally, and ground level 
ozone in particular.  Much of the critical attention in recent years, however, has 
not focused on why we may have failed to secure more widespread attainment 
of the ozone standard or how we might better our efforts to do so.  Instead, 
scholars have begun to question whether it makes for good policy to seek 
attainment of the ozone NAAQS in all areas of the country.  Some scholars 
have concluded that the costs of attaining the standard in many areas dwarf any 
benefits we could reasonably hope to gain through more cleanup. 
To be sure, this is hardly a new criticism.  From their very birth in 1970, 
national ambient air quality standards have been attacked as irrational and 
grossly inefficient because they ignore variations in the harms associated with 
pollution and the costs of pollution control from geographic area to geographic 
area.  As Professor Krier put it in 1974: 
[S]ince the costs of pollution and the costs of control vary across the country, it 
is difficult to see how a uniform standard can begin to take the varying costs 
into account.  The standard that minimizes total costs for a region in Iowa is 
hardly likely to do so for all the regions of California or New York or 
Colorado as well. To require adherence to the same stringent standard 
everywhere will in many areas result in the imposition of control costs which 
are much larger than the pollution costs avoided.15 
 
Amendments as “staggering” and concluding that “there is little reason to believe that there will 
be a significant return on the resources invested in the process”). 
 13. After areas were initially classified under the terms of the 1990 CAAA, all but ten urban 
areas were expected (and legally obligated to develop plans sufficient) to meet the ozone 
NAAQS.  The ten remaining areas were: Baltimore, Philadelphia-Wilmington-Trenton, 
Sacramento, and Ventura County, California—which are expected to meet the standard by 2005; 
Chicago-Gary-Lake County, Illinois, Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, Milwaukee-Racine, New 
York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, and California’s Southwest Desert—expected to meet 
the standard by 2007; and, lastly, Los Angeles, whose problems are probably hopeless—expected 
to meet the standard by 2010.  See GREEN BOOK, supra note 3.  The combined population of 
these areas is pretty large—roughly 55 million people—but as the text recounts, roughly 80% 
more people are exposed to unhealthy levels of ozone than was expected if the 1990 CAAA’s 
goals were met. 
 14. For a brief history of the Clean Air Act and Congress’s efforts to deal with the problem 
of nonattainment, see ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., AIR POLLUTION LAW 155-61 (1995). 
 15. James E. Krier, The Irrational National Ambient Air Quality Standards: Macro- and 
Micro-Mistakes, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 323, (1974); see James E. Krier, On the Topology of 
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Failure to attain health-based federal standards, on this view, may or may 
not viewed as a problem prudently to be solved.  It all depends on whether the 
costs ozone air pollution imposes on citizens of particular areas are greater or 
less than the costs those citizens would have to bear to attain and maintain the 
ozone NAAQS.  In more general terms, this critique attacks the very idea of 
“health-based” air quality standards, implicitly arguing that the purpose of any 
air pollution control program should not be to protect public health or the 
environment, but rather to “maximize welfare” or to achieve an efficient 
allocation of resources by reducing wasteful uses of air resources.  “Wasteful” 
uses of air resources, on this view, are those that impose greater societal costs 
(or yield fewer societal benefits) than competing uses.  Thus, in narrow 
efficiency terms, dedicating air resources for the use of breathers and to ensure 
healthy ecosystems may be wasteful if the aggregate benefits of these uses are 
less than the benefits foregone by those who are required in some measure to 
limit their uses of air resources as a pollution sink. 
If one accepts the initial premise of efficiency-related critiques of federal 
standards—that environmental quality is susceptible to meaningful treatment 
and analysis as a marketable good that is no different in principle than the 
legendary widget—two additional issues must be addressed.  First, federal 
uniform standards based only on the health effects of particular pollutants are 
problematic from an economic perspective only if those standards impose costs 
in excess of benefits in one or more areas of the nation to which they apply.  If 
the federal standard achieves net benefits in areas where pollution control costs 
are at their highest, then it cannot be said to be “irrational” to impose that 
standard everywhere—so long as the federal standards do not preempt more 
stringent local efforts to protect environmental values. 
If we assume, however, that uniform federal standards impose costs in 
excess of benefits in at least one area in the nation, then a second issue that 
must be addressed, but is missing in Professor Krier’s classic criticism of 
uniform federal standards, becomes more pertinent.  That issue concerns the 
appropriate level of aggregation for analysis—i.e., the appropriate area or 
analytic unit within which the costs and benefits of air quality standards are to 
be assessed and an appropriate regulatory program designed and implemented.  
This is an important consideration because the standard that yields the greatest 
benefits relative to costs may vary across levels of aggregation.  At one 
extreme, for example, the costs of pollution control for an individual facility 
are very likely to exceed the consequent benefits to that facility.  Yet, all would 
agree that in this situation the cost-benefit analysis is far too narrowly focused 
to inform public policy.  More relevant for purposes here, an air quality 
 
Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal System—And Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 
1226 (1995) [hereinafter Topography]. 
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standard may be net beneficial for the nation considered as a whole, but 
impose costs in excess of benefits, perhaps even grossly so, for a particular 
locality, state, or other jurisdictional unit. 
Professor Krier’s critique assumes that aggregating at the national level is 
inappropriate and that the appropriate analytic unit is some geographic area 
that is less inclusive than the nation as a whole.  While Professor Krier hints 
that the states may be a better jurisdictional unit for air quality regulation, he 
does not tell us how that conclusion was reached.  Given our constitutional 
structure, state environmental standards may well represent the most salient 
alternative to federal standards.  Moreover, there may be efficiency-related 
reasons independent of the standards themselves for relying on the states, such 
as reducing the costs of creating effective decision-making institutions by 
relying on pre-existing institutional structures.  Aside from these 
considerations, however, there is no a priori reason to rely on states and 
“federalism” as an efficiency-enhancing alternative to federal environmental 
regulation. 
Clearly, however, arguments for turning environmental regulation over to 
the states have increased dramatically in recent years and many of these 
arguments are based on the idea that the states should be considered the 
“optimum environmental jurisdiction.”16  Invoking notions of federalism, these 
arguments are often coupled with a claim that, in the absence of some 
compelling justification for federal intervention in the field of environmental 
protection, it is the states that should be responsible for determining a desirable 
level of environmental quality and for selecting the control measures requisite 
to achieving and maintaining that level.  The end-point of these arguments is 
the same: the federal government should simply bow out or drastically limit 
the scope of its regulatory authority. 
Critics of federal environmental regulation have concluded that federal 
regulation is warranted only if one or more of the following conditions obtain: 
(1) a “race-to-the-bottom” in which states, fearing competition from other 
states, relax environmental standards to suboptimal levels, and thus sacrifice 
social welfare, to attract or retain mobile capital investment; (2) the pollutant in 
question generates “interstate externalities”—that is, state regulation of the 
pollutant does not ensure that some significant amount of the pollution will not 
be transported to other states; (3) economies of scale, such as centralized 
research and technological knowledge, are so extensive at the federal level that 
they outweigh other, supposed inefficiencies associated with federal 
regulation; and (4) public choice problems are greatly more prominent at the 
state level than they are at the federal level, effectively permitting favored 
 
 16. See Richard O. Zerbe, Optimal Environmental Jurisdictions, 4 ECOL. L.Q. 193 (1974). 
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interests to dominate state policymaking.17  Each of these conditions 
represents, in now-fashionable terms, a species of “market failure”—an 
imperfection in the manner in which “property rights” are defined or the 
presence of “transactions costs” that prevent markets from working the magic 
of assuring that resources are devoted to their highest valued uses.18  From this 
perspective, any notion that a national commitment to environmental quality 
can properly be viewed as an attempt to place environmental quality beyond 
the reach of market determinism—perhaps because that commitment is viewed 
as a moral imperative or that environmental quality is a “right” that all 
individuals, no matter where they live, can legitimately invoke—is dismissed 
as romantic or worse.19  For proponents of economism, to describe and address 
environmental degradation as anything other than a question of how to allocate 
resources efficiently is to speak nonsense. 
Assaults on federal environmental regulation often are pitched at a high 
degree of generality, usually starting from the premise that federal standards 
are “uniform,” and therefore, inefficient.  A careful review shows that, while 
the CAA can plausibly be described as mandating uniform national standards, 
 
 17. These justifications are outlined in various places in the scholarly literature.  One of 
more extensive catalogs is Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Quality as National Good, 1997 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 199, 205-10 (1997).  See also William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental 
Federalism, and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (1997); 
Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only from a National Perspective) for 
Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 225 (1997); Richard L. 
Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996) 
[hereinafter Interstate Externalities]; Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: 
Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & 
POL. REV. 67 (1996); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Environmental Policy and Federal Structure: A 
Comparison of the United States and Germany, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1587 (1994); Richard B. 
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of 
National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977) [hereinafter Pyramids of Sacrifice]. 
 18. For a general discussion of why environmental degradation may appropriately be viewed 
as a symptom of one or market failures, see Esty, supra note 17, at 574-84.  Professor Esty 
himself, however, seems at times to suggest that this sort of market deterministic view of welfare 
and value is a bit flimsy.  See id. at 646 (noting that “[a] Kantian cosmopolitan perspective in 
which each person defines himself politically at least in part as a citizen of the world is an 
inescapable reality in the realm of environmental policy”). 
 19. As a sample of a typical “economic” response to the notion that environmental quality 
can be viewed as a moral imperative, consider the following assertions, which plainly reveal an 
enthusiasm for markets that rises to the level of religious fervor: 
The most reliable guide for the moral ideals of a polity as diverse as the United States lies 
in the revealed preferences of its citizens—that is, in the willingness of its citizens to pay 
for environmental quality.  Appeals to the moral ideals of the nation are often thinly 
disguised appeals to authority when more substantive policy justifications are lacking. 
Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 52. 
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that description obscures more than it clarifies practices under the CAA.  Two 
general points illustrate this.  First, the Clean Air Act’s national ambient air 
quality standards do not, in fact, require all areas to achieve or maintain the 
same level of air quality.  The Clean Air Act specifically mandates air quality 
that is better than the NAAQS in some areas and permits any state to select a 
standard that is more stringent than the NAAQS if the state so chooses.  Thus, 
federal air quality standards are minimum, not “uniform,” standards and may 
vary from area to area.  Second, in practice, the CAA’s standards are not 
enforced even as minimum standards.  Especially with ozone, much variation 
in air quality from state to state and area to area has been and continues to be 
tolerated, even in areas where the costs of air quality improvements may not be 
as high as they would be in other areas.  Moreover, few, if any, consequences 
befall areas that fail to meet minimum federal standards.  To a large extent, 
therefore, critics of “uniform” national air quality standards are making 
“merely theoretical” arguments, ignoring the “slippage” in practice between 
the written standards and practice.20 
Notwithstanding this slippage, I shall argue that the written mandates of 
the Clean Air Act, seeking minimum levels of air quality throughout the 
nation, are warranted for a number of reasons.  First, there are a variety of 
uncertainties about the environmental consequences of eliminating federal air 
quality standards and handing regulatory authority over to the states.  
Moreover, the case that state regulation would yield greater societal benefits is 
weak, resting on a number of rather implausible assumptions about state 
behavior in response to devolution.  Accordingly, while there are a number of 
problems with federal air quality regulation—most of which are unrelated to 
ambient air quality standards—the relative success of the Clean Air Act 
strongly supports a cautionary approach to devolution.  Second, federal 
minimum air quality standards may obviate a number of barriers to effective 
regulation of pollutants that states are likely to face.  Finally, drawing upon 
 
 20. See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative 
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 298, 300 (1999): 
The essential picture of regulation in much of the environmental literature is that 
Congress passes a law, federal agencies implement the program (usually through 
rulemaking), and compliance follows in due course. Of course, everyone knows that this 
is not the whole story, because sometimes there is slippage along the way. Still, this is the 
paradigm, and much effort is devoted to attacking, defending, or reforming it. . . . 
 
But we seriously misunderstand the regulatory system if we ignore the pervasive effect of 
compliance issues on the system as a whole. The problem of obtaining compliance—and 
sometimes, even knowing what “compliance” means—is pervasive. Regulatory slippage 
is as central to environmental law as water resistance is to aquatic life—a ubiquitous 
condition that limits efforts at movement and shapes the design and development of 
everything it surrounds. 
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Professor Richard Stewart’s conclusion that environmental quality has come to 
be regarded as “national good,”21 I argue that federal minimum air quality 
standards represent a responsible approach to ensuring innovative and effective 
measures to protect the public health and welfare. 
I. THE MYTH OF “UNIFORM” FEDERAL AIR QUALITY STANDARDS: LAW AND 
“SLIPPAGE” 
Much of the discussion and criticism of federal environmental regulation 
rests on a premise that is somewhat misleading, at least in the context of 
federal air quality standards.  That premise is that federal regulation imposes 
“uniform” standards.  In fact, the Clean Air Act prescribes only minimum 
ambient standards and, moreover, these minimum standards are not the same 
for all areas of the nation.  While some critics of federal regulation briefly 
mention these important aspects of the Clean Air Act, they are prone to ignore 
them and move quickly to explain why federal “uniform” standards are ill-
conceived.22  A more accurate portrait of federal air quality regulation would 
recognize that, in some circumstances, federal ambient standards are not 
uniform in law and certainly not uniform in practice.  In this section, I briefly 
describe the range of ambient standards contemplated by the Clean Air Act and 
then describe with greater particularity the provisions relating to ozone 
nonattainment areas and how those provisions have been implemented. 
The basic structure of the Clean Air Act is built around the centerpiece of 
federal national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for particular 
pollutants, currently six, which are promulgated by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA).23  These standards are supposed to represent the 
minimum level of air quality that, “allowing an adequate margin of safety, [is] 
requisite to protect the public health.”24  In considering criticisms of federal air 
 
 21. Stewart, National Good, supra note 17. 
 22. For example, Professor Revesz, in challenging the race-to-the-bottom rationale for 
federal regulation, acknowledges that federal air quality standards are not, in fact, uniform, but 
then slips into a practice of describing federal air quality standards as “uniform.  See Richard L. 
Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale 
for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210, 1222 (1992) (“uniform federal 
standards actually might reduce social welfare”) (emphasis added); see also Butler & Macey, 
supra note 12, at n.55 (describing federal air quality standards and concluding that “[t]he 
imposition of uniform national standards must reduce the social welfare of many communities”); 
Krier, Topology, supra note 15 (directing criticism at “uniform ambient quality standards”). 
 23. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(a); Whitman, 121 S. Ct. at 907 (describing NAAQS).  The six 
pollutants for which NAAQSs have been promulgated are sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, 
carbon monoxide, ozone, nitrogen dioxide, and lead.  See 40 C.F.R. Part 50. 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).  These health-based standards are formally designated as 
“primary” NAAQS.  EPA is also required to promulgate “secondary” NAAQS, which “shall 
specify a level of air quality the attainment and maintenance of which . . . is requisite to protect 
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quality standards, it is important to distinguish between ambient standards, 
such as the NAAQS, and emissions standards, such as motor vehicle tailpipe 
emissions standards.  Because the NAAQS are ambient standards, they do not 
in themselves require pollution controls for any particular source. 
Emissions controls can be distributed over a range of polluting sources and 
activities with varying degrees of stringency and costs.  The variety of sources 
that emit ozone precursors is in some areas quite large, so choices about which 
sources to regulate and how stringently to regulate them can be quite complex.  
This distribution of control requirements can be an important factor—indeed, 
the most important factor—in how large the aggregate costs of attaining the 
NAAQS will be. 
Under the 1970 Clean Air Act, the federal government’s role in selecting 
emissions controls to achieve the NAAQS was important, but quite limited.  
Federal emissions standards were contemplated for only two categories of 
sources: motor vehicles25 and new or modified stationary sources.26  The larger 
and politically sensitive task of selecting controls for existing sources and 
activities was left to the states.  Each state was responsible in the first instance 
for developing a state implementation plan (SIP) “which provides for 
implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of [the NAAQS] in each air 
quality control region (or portion thereof) within such State.”27  Thus, the 
states can provide selective incentives for particular sources by choosing to 
regulate them more or less stringently than other sources.  Moreover, given the 
wide variability in air quality throughout the nation at the time Congress 
enacted the 1970 Act, some areas would be faced with requirements to impose 
extensive and sometimes costly control measures, while other areas would 
required to impose very few, if any, controls to attain the NAAQS. 
Without more, this simple description of the Clean Air Act might indeed 
lead one to conclude that the legislation mandates “nationally uniform” 
ambient standards, though not nationally uniform emissions controls.  The 
Clean Air Act does not, however, prevent states from adopting air quality 
 
the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of 
such air pollutant in the ambient air.” § 7409(b)(2).  For purposes of this article, I will ignore the 
secondary standards, which for ozone is the same as the primary standard.  40 C.F.R. § 50.9(a). 
 25. Pub. L. No. 90-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1690 (1970). 
 26. Id. at § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1683.  The 1970 Act also included provisions for emissions 
limitations on stationary sources of hazardous air pollutants, which are air pollutants that pose 
serious health risks but are not regulated by ambient standards.  Id. § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1685.  
Reductions of hazardous air pollutants may in some cases contribute to attainment of the 
NAAQS, but the regulation of these sources is not designed to facilitate compliance with the 
NAAQS. 
 27. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (“Each State shall . . . . adopt and submit to [EPA] . . . a plan 
which provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of [the NAAQS] in each air 
quality control region (or portion thereof) within such State.”). 
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standards more stringent than the NAAQS.28  States are thus free to set 
standards or mandate pollution controls that yield a mix of environmental 
quality and industrial activity different from the mix that would obtain if the 
NAAQS were adhered to everywhere, so long as the standards the states select 
yield air quality that is at least as good as, or better than, that required by the 
NAAQS.29  An accurate description of federal standards, therefore, is that they 
are national minimum standards.  Necessarily, then, critics of federal ambient 
air quality standards do not object to their “uniformity,” but rather to their 
strictness.  If the NAAQS were set at the lowest level desired by any state, and 
were not preemptive of more stringent state standards, then the NAAQS 
represent a federal mandate to which the states would willingly adhere.  Of 
course, such a standard would be useful only to the extent that federal 
involvement produced some effective supplement to state regulation that, if 
absent, would impair the states’ ability to maintain the NAAQS or a preferred 
more stringent standard. 
But even allowing for stricter standards, the simple portrait of the Clean 
Air just painted masks a much richer and diverse picture.  As the statute is 
currently written, different areas are subject to different federal standards, both 
of the ambient and emissions varieties.  While the 1970 Act did treat all areas 
of the country the same in terms of prescribing minimum ambient standards, 
subsequent amendments do not mandate the same result. 
The applicable ambient standard varies from area to area in two ways 
under the statute: (1) the minimum level of air quality to be achieved or 
maintained; and (2) the date on which the applicable ambient standard must be 
attained.  These variations are the result of Congress’s decisions, first, in 1977 
to treat “dirty air areas” and “clean air areas” differently, and then in 1990 to 
treat “dirty air areas” differently depending on just how “dirty” each area is. 
A. Variations in Ambient Standards for “Clean Air Areas”: The PSD 
Program 
When it became clear that many areas of the country would not come even 
close to attaining the NAAQSs by the 1970 Act’s statutory deadline, Congress 
in 1977 amended the Act to extend attainment dates and to refine SIP 
requirements.  For present purposes, one of the more important choices 
Congress made in 1977 was to divide the country into nonattainment areas and 
“clean air areas” and to impose specific SIP requirements for both types of 
areas.  The resulting programs introduced variation not only in the SIP 
requirements, but also variation in the minimum level of air quality the areas 
would be required to achieve or maintain. 
 
 28. See 42 U.S.C. § 7416. 
 29. Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 265 (1976). 
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The 1977 amendments codified an elaborate Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (“PSD”) program that prescribes the allowable level of air 
quality degradation to be permitted in areas classified as “attainment,” or 
“clean air,” areas—areas with air quality that is better than that required by a 
NAAQS.30  The effect of the PSD program, at least for some pollutants, is to 
establish ambient air quality standards that vary depending on two variables: 
an area’s pre-existing air quality and choices by the states about how much 
degradation in air quality is consistent with their own respective policies and 
needs. 
The complexities of the PSD program are notorious, but for present 
purposes a simple sketch illustrates the basic point that federal law does not 
impose “uniform” ambient air quality standards.  The PSD program is 
implemented through a permit program for new and modified “major emitting 
facilities.”31  For a permit to issue, such facilities must, inter alia, employ the 
“best available control technology [BACT] for each pollutant subject to 
regulation under [the Clean Air Act],”32 and demonstrate that “emissions from 
construction or operation of such facility will not cause, or contribute to, air 
pollution in excess” of (1) specified increases in the ambient concentration of 
NAAQS pollutants, known as “increments”; (2) the NAAQS; or (3) “any other 
applicable emission standard or standard of performance under [the Clean Air 
Act].”33  If the BACT levels of pollution control are insufficient to maintain 
ambient concentrations of a pollutant within the applicable limits, the source 
must either implement more stringent control measures or seek emissions 
reductions from other, existing sources that contribute to ambient levels of the 
pollutant in the area.34 
By focusing on new and modified sources and mandating BACT, the PSD 
program rather directly affects the states’ abilities to manipulate environmental 
standards to achieve the states’ desired mix of environmental quality and 
economic activity, for it is at the point of such significant new investment that 
firms may be most apt to consider different locations.  Yet, within the federal 
standards governing the PSD program, the states retain some, albeit limited, 
discretion.  States may, as noted above, select air quality standards that are 
 
 30. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479.  For detailed descriptions of the PSD program, see 
generally Craig Oren, Prevention of Significant Deterioration: Control-Compelling v. Site 
Shifting, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1988); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ON PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION OF AIR QUALITY 
(1981); M. William Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the Courts: The 
Erratic Pursuit of Clean Air and Clean Water, 62 IOWA L. REV. 643 (1977). 
 31. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475.  Major emitting facilities are defined at 42 U.S.C. § 7579(1). 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4). 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3). 
 34. See Oren, supra note 30, at 27. 
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more stringent than federal minimum standards.  States’ ability to relax air 
quality standards is drastically more limited, but within the PSD program there 
is room for some adjustments of this sort. 
The extent to which air quality will be permitted to degrade in particular 
areas subject to the PSD program depends on the size of the applicable 
increment and on the areas’ air quality at a particular point in time—the areas’ 
respective “baseline dates.”  The applicable increment will depend on whether 
the area is classified as a Class I, Class II, or Class III area, with Class I areas 
having the smallest increment and Class III areas having the largest 
increment.35  For each of these classes, the statute (or EPA by regulation) 
establishes the applicable increment in air quality degradation to be 
permitted.36  The increment is expressed in terms of a maximum allowable 
increase in concentrations of particular pollutants, subject to the requirement 
that ambient concentrations may not otherwise exceed the applicable 
NAAQS.37 
The size of the increments do not vary within each of the three 
classifications—i.e., all Class II areas are subject to the same allowable 
increment.  Nonetheless, the applicable ambient standard will vary from area to 
area.  This is because the applicable PSD ambient standard will be equal to the 
sum of the fixed increment and the “baseline concentration” of the particular 
pollutant in each PSD area.  The baseline concentration is defined as “the 
ambient concentration levels [of a particular pollutant] which exist at the time 
of the first application for a permit in an area subject to [the PSD program], 
based on air quality data available in [EPA] or a State air pollution control 
agency and on such monitoring data as the permit applicant is required to 
submit.”38  This baseline concentration will, of course, vary from area to area.  
As a result, the applicable ambient standard for one PSD area may also be 
different from the ambient standard for another PSD area, even if those areas 
are placed in the same Class, due to variability in the ambient concentration of 
particular pollutants on the areas’ respective “baseline date.”39  For example, 
 
 35. See 42 U.S.C. § 7473. 
 36. The statute sets maximum allowable increases for sulfur dioxide and particulates.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 7473.  For other pollutants, EPA is required to promulgate regulations which “provide 
specific measures at least as effective as the increments established” for sulfur dioxide and 
particulates.  42 U.S.C. § 7476(d). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 7473(b)(4). 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(4); see also Alabama Power v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 374-76 (D.C.Cir 
1980) (discussing “baseline date”). 
 39. See Oren, supra note 30, at 23.  Professor Oren describes the PSD standards as “tertiary” 
standards, distinguishing them from the primary and secondary NAAQS. 
  [T]he sum of the increments and the pre-existing baseline concentration amounts to a 
kind of “tertiary” standard controlling the maximum level of pollution in any clean air 
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the ambient sulfur dioxide standard (expressed as the annual arithmetic mean 
concentration of sulfur dioxide in micrograms per cubic meter of air) for an 
area designated as a Class II area, and a corresponding allowable increment of 
20 micrograms per cubic meter of air,40 with a baseline concentration of 50 
would be 70, whereas the ambient standard for an area with a baseline 
concentration of 40 would be 60.  Once the baseline concentration has been 
established and the appropriate increment selected, states must prevent air 
quality from deteriorating beyond the prescribed level.41 
The amount of growth in emissions that a particular area may permit—the 
size of the applicable increment—depends on whether the area is designated as 
a Class I, Class II, or Class III area.  Areas of special federal concern—e.g., 
large national parks and national wilderness areas—are placed in the most 
protected classifications, Class I or Class II, and may not be redesignated to a 
less-protected class.42  The restrictive standards for these areas are not properly 
subject to the same criticism usually leveled against the NAAQSs, for in such 
areas federal interests properly dominate state or local interests. 
All other areas are designated as Class II areas.43  Importantly, most areas 
designated as Class II areas by the statute may be redesignated by states or 
tribal authorities as either Class I or Class III areas.44  The PSD program thus 
permits areas to make some decisions about the desired mix of economic 
activity and environmental quality.45  A state seeking to encourage new or 
modified major sources to locate in the state could be expected to redesignate 
Class II areas as Class III areas to accommodate the maximum concentration 
of pollutants permissible under the CAA, and thus, lower the costs to new and 
modified sources.46  Surprisingly, however, no state has yet chosen to 
 
area.  Unlike the [NAAQS], though, the tertiary standard is not uniform; rather, it varies 
according to the baseline concentration in each area and the classification of the area. 
Id. at 28. 
 40. See 42 U.S.C. § 7473(b)(2). 
 41. See 42 U.S.C. § 7471; see Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 361-64 (discussing obligations of 
states to protect increments). 
 42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7472(a), 7474(a)(1)-(2).  Protected national areas originally designated as 
Class II areas may be redesignated as Class I areas.  See id. § 7474(a). 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 7472(b). 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 7474(a). 
 45. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. 
REV. 1183 1196  (“The PSD program explicitly permits economic development that will degrade 
air quality to some extent, and there are provisions (admittedly they are procedurally 
burdensome) that permit each state to adopt either a relatively pro-development or more 
environmentally protective PSD program.”). 
 46. See Final Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 12853 (Mar. 18, 1994) (“Class III increments allow for 
higher levels of industrial growth.”). 
  There are certain fixed costs imposed on new or modified major sources, regardless of 
where these sources choose to locate.  All such sources must comply with the BACT requirement, 
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redesignate any Class II area as a Class III area.47  Put in slightly different way, 
no state has yet found it necessary or appropriate to sacrifice air quality to 
achieve desired economic goals, at least for those pollutants to which the Class 
designations are applicable and for those areas that currently enjoy air quality 
better than the level of the NAAQS. 
The absence of effort on the part of states to redesignate Class II areas to 
Class III areas suggests that, for at least some pollutants, federal minimum 
standards do not impose serious constraints on industrial activities in large 
portions of the nation.  In fact, all areas of the nation are considered PSD areas 
for one or more pollutants for which a NAAQS has been established.48  
Accordingly, the PSD program is applicable nationwide. 
Nonetheless, it would be improper to conclude that experience under the 
PSD program permits a conclusion that federal standards do not hamper states’ 
choices about the appropriate mix of air quality and industrial activity.  First, 
the PSD program is a pollutant specific regime.  Thus, an area can be a PSD 
area for one or more pollutants, while also being designated as a nonattainment 
area for one or more pollutants.  While all areas are subject to the PSD 
program, new or modified major sources of pollutants for which an area is in 
nonattainment are subject to a different regulatory program that, inter alia, 
effectively precludes such sources from contributing to further air quality 
degradation.49  Thus, the NAAQS place rather strict limits on the ability of 
 
for example.  BACT standards are set by reference to federal criteria, but they are not nationally 
uniform; BACT is determined on a permit-by-permit basis.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (defining 
best available control technology as a that which is determined on” on a case-by-case basis” to 
meet statutory criteria).  Thus, states have some discretion to manipulate the BACT requirement 
to reduce costs to industry, although EPA has issued guidance designed to control the exercise of 
that discretion.  See Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New 
Source Review (NSR), Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 61 Fed. Reg. 38250, 38,272-73 (July 23, 
1996) (describing EPA BACT determination methodology) [hereinafter NSR Proposed 
Rulemaking].  Cost savings for new or modified major sources can be expected from a larger 
increment in situations in which either the increment has already been consumed or states seek to 
allocate the remaining available increment among present and future sources.  In these 
circumstances, a new or modified source may be required to seek offsetting reductions from 
existing sources in the area to ensure that the new or modified source’s emissions do not cause 
the available increment to be exceeded.  For discussion, see Oren, supra note 30, at 30-40. 
 47. Id. at 25-26 (noting that “[t]here is . . . no area carrying the Class III designation”). 
 48. For example, all areas of the country currently meet the NAAQS for nitrogen dioxide.  
See TRENDS REPORT, supra note 4, at 14. 
 49. New or modified “major stationary sources” in nonattainment areas are subject to a 
permitting program established pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7503.  Among other things, to gain a 
permit, major sources must offset their pollutant emissions by obtaining emissions reductions of 
that pollutant from existing sources.  Id. § 7503(c).  For some pollutants, including ozone, the 
ratio of new emissions to offsetting emissions reductions from existing sources that a new major 
source must secure increases with the severity of nonattainment.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511a(a)(4), 
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nonattainment areas to select a mix of economic activity and environmental 
quality. 
Second, increments within the PSD program have not been established for 
ozone, which is the most widespread air quality problem in the nation.  As 
presently structured, the PSD program includes increments for only three 
pollutants: sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, and nitrogen dioxide.50  Without 
established allowable increments for ozone, the only ambient standard that 
must be satisfied under the PSD program for ozone is the NAAQS. 
Despite these limitations, for many areas of the nation, perhaps most, it 
seems plausible to conclude that the NAAQS have not required states to 
sacrifice economic growth to achieve compliance with air quality standards.  If 
this is right, it significantly blunts the force of the standard efficiency-related 
criticism of federal air quality standards. 
B. Variations in the Ozone NAAQS for Nonattainment Areas 
There are, of course, many areas that currently do not meet the ozone 
NAAQS.  If the ozone NAAQS is impairing economic growth in derogation of 
local preferences, as critics charge, it would be within these areas that we could 
expect to find the proof.  On the other hand, because the areas are not currently 
satisfying the federal ozone standard, we cannot be sure of the costs associated 
with achieving air quality consistent with the NAAQS.  Given the complexities 
associated with either of these inquiries—which I concede to be beyond my 
capacity—a surrogate inquiry may be useful in assessing the extent to which 
the ozone NAAQS exacts welfare losses in particular areas.  We might ask, in 
relation to nonattainment areas, what costs states face by virtue of their 
nonattainment status.  For purposes of this analysis, “costs” are limited to the 
sanctions or penalties federal law exacts for noncompliance.  If these 
noncompliance costs for any particular area are significant, but noncompliance 
continues, we could plausibly conclude that the NAAQS standards impose 
costs in excess of benefits in that area, otherwise a state interested in 
maximizing welfare would choose to comply rather than face the costs of 
noncompliance.  By contrast, if states face no costs, or only minimal costs, for 
noncompliance, a “rational,” welfare- maximizing state will simply ignore the 
NAAQS and opt for air quality that the area believes achieves the appropriate 
mix of economic activity and environmental quality.  In these circumstances, 
we could plausibly conclude that the NAAQS do not exact welfare losses for 
particular areas. 
 
7511a(b)(5), 7511a(c)(10), 7511a(d)(2), 7511a(e)(1)-(2).  For a general overview of the 
requirements applicable to new or modified major stationary sources, see NSR Proposed 
Rulemaking, supra note 46, at 38,253-55. 
 50. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(c); Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F. Supp. 165 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
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Before considering these issues, it is necessary, first, to get a working idea 
of what “compliance” with the NAAQS means under the provisions of the 
Clean Air Act. 
1. The Meaning of “Compliance” and “Nonattainment” 
As mentioned above, in 1977, Congress began to classify areas into PSD 
areas and nonattainment areas.  This decision was largely in recognition of the 
widespread failure to attain and the political and economic unacceptability of 
continuing to treat nonattaining areas as being “in violation of the law” with 
the threat of sanctions.  The importance of the 1977 amendments formalizing a 
class of areas as “nonattainment areas,” and subjecting this class to 
requirements different from those applicable to clean air areas, lies in the 
recognition that an area may be in “nonattainment” with the NAAQS, but still 
be in “compliance” with the Clean Air Act.  Few critics of “uniform” federal 
environmental standards have regarded the distinction between compliance 
with the statute and attainment of the NAAQS as significant.  Clearly, 
however, if areas are deemed to be in compliance with the statute by achieving 
a level of air quality that is somewhat less clean than the NAAQS and may 
delay attainment of the NAAQS for a period of several years without incurring 
sanctions, the welfare effects of the statute are likely to be considerably 
different than the welfare effects of a statute that required immediate 
attainment. 
Under the 1977 amendments, little variation in regulatory treatment among 
nonattainment areas appears to have been contemplated.  All such areas were 
required to attain the ozone NAAQS as “expeditiously as practicable, but . . . . 
not later than December 31, 1982,” unless attainment by that date was not 
possible, “despite the implementation of all reasonably available measures.”  
In such a case, attainment could be postponed until December 31, 1987.51  All 
such areas were required to revise their SIPs to include various requirements, 
such as provisions for implementing “all reasonably available control measures 
as expeditiously as practicable,” “reasonably available control technology” for 
existing sources, and a permit program for major new or modified stationary 
sources.52  Yet, given the generality of most of these requirements, 
nonattainment areas with vastly different SIPs were deemed to be in 
compliance with the statute. 
In the 1990 amendments, Congress departed from past legislative practice 
and concluded that it would be inappropriate to treat all ozone nonattainment 
areas the same or to set general SIP requirements that vested large amounts of 
discretion in the states and EPA.  Different treatment of different areas was 
 
 51. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129(b), 91 Stat. 746 (1977). 
 52. Id., 91 Stat. 747. 
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deemed appropriate in apparent recognition of the difference in the rates that 
areas could reasonably be expected to attain the NAAQS.  As a result, the 1990 
Act places ozone nonattainment areas into one of six categories, depending on 
the seriousness of the areas’ ozone problems.53  The classification system 
effectively prescribes different ambient standards for each classification.  It 
does so by varying the deadlines by which areas in the respective 
classifications are required to attain the ozone NAAQS.  Areas with ozone 
concentrations just above the NAAQS were required to attain the ozone 
NAAQS by 1993, while areas with the most severe ozone problems were given 
until 2010 to achieve the NAAQS.54 
This extended period for attainment can be explained as a way to 
incorporate costs and feasibility considerations into the design of the ambient 
standards, where otherwise such considerations are prohibited.55  Extended 
attainment dates can be expected to reduce the total costs of attaining the 
NAAQS in a number of ways—e.g., permitting older polluting equipment to 
be used for more of its economic life before it must be replaced with cleaner 
technologies; providing a longer opportunity for the innovation and 
development of low-polluting technologies, such as alternative-fuel vehicles, 
and making these technologies available at lower cost; and enabling firms to 
phase-in less polluting technologies over longer periods of time, reducing the 
overall costs of doing so. 
The 1990 amendments did, however, purport to limit the discretion of 
states in terms of the timing of certain controls and in ways that Congress 
deemed reasonable.  To be in “compliance” with the 1990 amendments, as 
with the 1977 amendments, states with nonattainment areas had to enact and 
implement various SIP revisions in accordance with fixed statutory schedules, 
and demonstrate attainment by the applicable attainment date.  To be sure, 
these requirements are complex, but on their face, the statutory requirements 
seem by degrees considerably more precise than those of the 1977 
amendments.  In theory, then, it should be a relatively straightforward matter to 
determine whether any particular nonattainment area was in compliance with 
the statute, regardless whether it had attained the NAAQS.  In practice, 
however, determining whether a state with an ozone nonattainment area is in 
compliance (officially and non-officially) with the statute has proven to be a 
considerably more complex issue. 
2. Slippage: Variance Between Practice and Statute 
 
 53. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511(a).  The are classifications are marginal, moderate, serious, severe, 
severe-17, and extreme. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Whitman, 121 S. Ct. at 903. 
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The foregoing discussion indicates that the Clean Air Act makes provision 
for varying ambient air quality standards, and thus, criticisms premised on the 
notion that federal law requires uniform standards to be met is somewhat 
misleading.  Efforts to accommodate the varying costs of achieving the 
NAAQS are accounted for both in the PSD program, which actually imposes 
variable standards, and the special provisions for ozone nonattainment areas in 
the 1990 Act, which do not vary the standard to be achieved, but provide for 
longer time frames and differential SIP revisions for compliance in areas where 
an immediate or short-term requirement to attain the NAAQS might be 
considered unrealistic or excessively costly. 
The variability in ambient standards permitted by the Clean Air Act is, 
however, relatively modest, and for nonattainment areas the variation 
permitted is unlikely to satisfy critics’ concerns about the inefficiencies they 
claim are the inevitable consequence of uniform national standards.  Yet, 
within the constraints of the ozone NAAQS, much greater variation in actual 
air quality, and control requirements, is permitted in practice than one might 
expect from an analysis of the statute alone. 
A more pragmatic assessment of the NAAQS would consider the fuller 
institutional framework within which the permissible—or at least tolerated—
concentration of ozone for any particular area is determined.  As a rough guide 
for such an assessment, the following variables would seem pertinent: (1) the 
ozone NAAQS; (2) state decisions concerning whether to adopt a standard 
more stringent than the NAAQS; (3) the area’s attainment date; (4) the 
applicable requirements governing SIPs; (5) the manner in which EPA (and the 
courts) interpret regulatory requirements; (6) the rigor with which statutory 
requirements for ozone nonattainment areas are enforced by EPA and the 
courts; and (7) the extent to which SIP control measures selected by a state and 
approved by EPA actually yield the expected (or claimed) reductions in 
ambient ozone levels.  The last three factors are rarely considered by critics of 
federal standards, but the relevance of these factors to their efficiency claims 
seems obvious and critical.  As Professor Farber argues: 
[C]ompliance with standards is frequently delayed, incomplete, or even 
nonexistent. Thus, standards may commonly function as starting points in the 
lengthy interactions between agencies and regulated parties, rather than as end 
points of compliance. . . .  The optimum “standards” for these purposes may 
well be quite different from (and often harsher than) the ultimate performance 
level that we wish to attain. 
  To the extent this situation holds true—to the extent, that is, that slippage 
is widespread—it is far from clear that the standards themselves should reflect 
an optimum balance of compliance costs and environmental benefits. The fact 
that the standards are sometimes too harsh—that they have compliance costs 
that are too high compared with benefits—may be perfectly reasonable. In 
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effect, the standards may merely be the government’s opening demand in 
negotiations, and the final bargain is likely to be more favorable to the other 
side. . . . .  Thus, the criticism that regulatory standards are too harsh loses 
some of its force, once it is recognized that the standards are often only 
partially implemented. 
  Similarly, attacks on the “one size fits all” nature of regulation also lose 
some of their force once slippage is taken into account.56 
In considering the potential for “slippage” it is useful to start with the basic 
division of responsibilities between EPA and the states under the Clean Air.  
This structural arrangement, which vests responsibility to implement source-
specific control measures almost entirely in the states, virtually invites 
variation between the statute as written and the statute as implemented in 
circumstances where the state’s interests diverge from strict compliance with 
the statute.  Professor Dwyer, for example, has concluded that “[a]lthough it 
has as much legal authority as it needs, the federal government cannot 
implement its air pollution program without the substantial resources, 
expertise, information, and political support of state and local officials.”57  
Similarly, Professor McGarity, has observed that the Clean Air Act’s “system 
of dual responsibility . . . has given state and local institutions a great deal of 
flexibility to make concessions to local economic and political constraints in 
addressing local pollution problems.”58 
Often “concessions” to state and local preferences take the form of rather 
direct deviations from statutory requirements, but such deviations are often 
clouded by technical issues, making them difficult to identify.  Moreover, the 
available methods to hold institutions and practices accountable once deviance 
from statutory requirements is apparent are cumbersome and, to a considerable 
extent, have not been ineffective.59  As a consequence, the Clean Air Act in 
 
 56. Farber, supra note 20, at 315-16; see Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of 
Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 57 (2001) (noting that under-enforcement 
may “represent ‘bottom up’ efforts to improve the rationality of the command statutory system in 
light of practical experience with its implementation,” that the aim of slippage, “like that of 
formal cost-benefit analysis and risk analysis, is to avoid imposing regulatory costs that are 
disproportionate to benefits and to conserve administrative resources for higher priority 
environmental protection tasks,” and that slippage “can accordingly be regarded, in many cases, 
as pragmatic applications of cost-benefit analysis and risk regulatory prioritization”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 57. Dwyer, supra note 45, at 1224. 
 58. Thomas O. McGarity, Missing Milestones: A Critical Look at the Clean Air Act’s VOC 
Emissions Reduction Program in Nonattainment Areas, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 41, 42 (1999). 
 59. The chief method of enforcing statutory requirements when EPA and the states are 
unwilling to adhere to the statute is citizens suits.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7604.  For a suggestion that 
citizen suits may not be an effective way to accomplish this objective, at least in some 
circumstances, see McGarity, supra note 58, at 97-98. 
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practice is quite a different regulatory program than one would gather from a 
review of the statute alone. 
A. Experience Under the 1977 Amendments 
The problems dogging effective implementation of the NAAQS are 
complex.  In the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, Congress first directly 
addressed the problem of nonattainment and developed specific programs 
designed to induce the states to make “reasonable further progress” toward 
attainment.  The chief mechanisms for this purpose were provisions permitting 
EPA to extend the attainment date for such areas by as much as ten years and 
mandates for revisions to state implementation plans, including requirements 
to adopt and implement certain control measures.60  To provide incentives for 
states to make the appropriate SIP revisions, EPA was authorized to cut off 
federal funds for highway construction in the event states failed to submit the 
SIPs.  Additionally, in areas that failed to meet their new attainment dates, new 
major sources and modifications to existing major sources were banned.  
Finally, as with the 1970 Act, EPA was authorized to implement a control 
program of its own design (a federal implementation plan, or “FIP”) in states 
where SIPs were not forthcoming or were inadequate. 
Nonetheless, the program requirements for nonattainment areas proved 
extraordinarily difficult to implement.  Many states did not submit adequate 
SIPs and many failed to attain the ozone NAAQS by 1987.61  EPA was 
reluctant to impose sanctions on these areas, and when it proposed to do so, 
Congress twice came to the rescue and extended the areas’ attainment dates 
and/or prohibited EPA from going forward with sanctions.62  The clear 
message to the states was that the federal government was not really serious 
about forcing the states to implement programs that they otherwise would not 
willingly accept.63 
The states’ failure to develop adequate SIPs in response to the 1977 
amendments and the continuing problems of nonattainment have been 
addressed in a few studies.64  Some of the factors identified as contributing to 
 
 60. See Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129, 91 Stat. 685, 746-51 (1977). 
 61. See Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean 
Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1689 (1991) (“Many states produced ‘cheater SIPs’ they never 
expected to implement.”). 
 62. Office of Technology Assessment, Urban Ozone and the Clean Air Act: Problems and 
Proposals for Change 119-20 (1988) [hereinafter cited as OTA Report]. 
 63. Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987).  For a discussion of the implementation of 
the 1977 amendments, see McGarity, supra note 58, at 46-50. 
 64. See, e.g., id. at 46-50; Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and 
the New Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1688-95 (1991); Craig N. Oren, The Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 A Bridge to the Future?, 21 ENVTL. L. 1817, 1834-35 (1991); OTA Report, 
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these problems include: incomplete and inaccurate information about pollutant 
emissions levels leading to underestimates of the reductions in emissions 
needed to attain the NAAQS; “gaming” behavior by state regulators who 
manipulated atmospheric models in developing SIPs to show attainment within 
the applicable time frame with the least stringent controls; inadequate funding 
and expertise among state agencies; failures by states to implement or enforce 
SIP requirements; EPA delays in issuing critical rules and guidance 
documents; political resistance to necessary controls by state legislators; 
interstate transport of pollutants; and unreasonable deadlines.65  As Professor 
Latin reports, EPA itself admitted that the agency was” reluctant to formally 
reject [state submissions], but rather [tried] to work with their colleagues in the 
processing chain by phone calls and protracted negotiation.”66 
In addition to these problems, one clear conclusion emerges: 
Notwithstanding the NAAQS and provisions for sanctions on recalcitrant 
states, the 1977 amendments simply were not implemented in a way that would 
force states to severely limit or reduce what the states perceived to be a 
desirable level of economic activity for the sake of air quality improvements.67  
In a study by the General Accounting Office, investigators concluded that state 
and local officials displayed “a general reluctance to implement control 
measures that will have a negative impact on economic development or change 
life-styles.”68  Importantly, as suggested above, this reluctance was not 
countered by aggressive federal oversight: 
[S]tate officials, who had never been inclined to press local industries and 
commuters, detected a subtle and sometimes explicit message that few 
consequences would attend the failure to meet their SIP obligations, despite the 
clear language of the statute.  They also correctly perceived that the probability 
the EPA would write its own FIP for the states was vanishingly small.  States 
simply had no incentive to implement effective emissions control programs 
 
supra note 62, at 122-28; U.S. General Accounting Office, Air Pollution: Ozone Nonattainment 
Requires Long-Term Solutions to Solve Complex Problems, Report No. GAO/RCED-88-40 (1988) 
[hereinafter cited as GAO Report]; William Pedersen, Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 
U. PA. L. REV. 1059 (1981). 
 65. See OTA Report, supra note 62, at 122-28. 
 66. Latin, supra note 61, at 1691 (quoting EPA, State Implementation Plan Processing 
Reform, 54 Fed. Reg. 2214, 2217 (1989)). 
 67. See id. at 1657-58 (describing EPA’s unwillingness to require SIPs that would impose 
economic hardship).  Latin proposes as one “law of administrative behavior” the maxim that 
“agencies avoid making regulatory decisions that would create severe social or economic 
dislocation.”  Id. at 1656. 
 68. GAO Report, supra note 64 at 27 (quoted in OTA Report, supra note 62, at 128). 
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over the determined opposition of local companies and local automobile 
drivers.69 
Lacking incentives to comply with the apparent rigidity of the CAA, 
“regulation in practice [was] more like an extended and generally acrimonious 
negotiation involving EPA, the states, various industries, and Congress, with 
the courts often serving as the referee.”70 
B. Experience Under the 1990 Amendments 
In light of this experience under the 1977 amendments, an important 
question is whether the 1990 amendments have altered the respective 
bargaining positions of state and federal authorities in ways that yield greater 
state investment in attaining the ozone NAAQS than would otherwise be 
warranted in light of local preferences.  The primary way in which the federal 
hand could be strengthened is to raise the costs for states that fail to meet 
federal standards through sanctions or other mechanisms.  In the theoretical 
literature, the assumption appears to be that the costs to states of 
noncompliance with the NAAQS are currently very high, virtually precluding 
the states from deliberately choosing to settle for ambient air quality of lesser 
quality than that demanded by federal law.  Were it otherwise, the argument 
that the CAA places too much control in the federal government and mandates 
unwanted levels of environmental quality (and its attendant costs) on otherwise 
unwilling citizens, loses much of its practical force. That is, if states can, 
without incurring significant costs, successfully negotiate with federal 
authorities a strategy of attaining air quality that is somewhat less protective of 
public health than the ozone NAAQS, the argument for devolution of formal 
authority to the states would have to be based on something other than the 
claim that federal law fails to account for variation in conditions among the 
different regions of the nation. 
Experience to date under the 1990 amendments suggests that, as in the 
past, states are not likely to face very high costs for failing to meet federal 
mandates.  Accordingly, a realistic appraisal of the CAA’s functioning does 
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that its formal insistence on attainment 
of nationally uniform standards is utterly insensitive to variations in local 
preferences. 
In the 1990 Amendments, Congress did attempt to address some of the 
problems under the 1977 amendments by imposing what Congress perceived 
 
 69. McGarity, supra note 58, at 49.  McGarity also surveys additional reasons why the 1977 
amendments failed to achieve widespread attainment of the ozone NAAQS.  Id. at 48-50. 
 70. George Eads, The Confusion of Goals and Instruments: The Explicit Consideration of 
Cost in Setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards, in FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW AND POLICY 259, 262 (Richard L. Revesz ed., 1997). 
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to be more realistic attainment dates and control programs. The obligations of 
states containing ozone nonattainment areas were spelled out in extraordinary 
detail in the statute.  While attainment dates were extended, Congress “added 
short-term deadlines for many intermediate steps, including SIP 
submissions.”71 These intermediate steps include innovative mechanisms 
designed to provide incentives against noncompliance and to ensure that 
control measures yield the ozone reduction benefits they are supposed to. 
First, Congress demanded that states “submit a comprehensive, accurate, 
current inventory of actual emissions from all sources,” and to update such 
inventories every three years until the ozone NAAQS is attained.72  The hope 
was that such inventories would correct the problem of unrealistic assessments 
of extant emissions and the amount of reductions needed to attain the 
NAAQS—a problem that was widely perceived as one of the more significant 
failings under prior law.73 
Second, for all but “marginal” nonattainment areas, Congress 
supplemented the 1997 amendments’ vague requirement that states revise their 
SIPs to demonstrate “reasonable further progress” toward attainment of the 
ozone NAAQS with specific emission reduction targets.  All areas save for 
marginal areas were required to implement rate of progress plans that included 
sufficient control measures to reduce emissions of volatile organic compounds 
(VOCs)—a primary ozone precursor—from 1990 baseline levels by 15% by 
no later than 1996.74  Serious, severe, and extreme nonattainment areas were 
additionally required to reduce VOC emissions by 3% annually after 1996 until 
the NAAQS was attained.75  The Amendments also include a variety of 
additional control measures that states must adopt, including for example, 
vehicle inspection and maintenance programs, gasoline vapor recovery 
systems, and improved measures for assuring that major stationary sources 
were employing reasonably available control technologies.76  The control 
measures become incrementally more stringent as the applicable classification 
 
 71. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Browner, 57 F.3d 1122, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511a(a)(1), (3). 
 73. See OTA Report, supra note 62, at 123-25. 
 74. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(b)(1)(A).  Under certain circumstances, reductions of less than 15 
percent are permitted.  See id.  § 7511a(b)(1)(A)(ii).  A similar percentage reduction is required 
for emissions of nitrogen oxides.  See id. § 7511a(f). 
 75. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(c)(1)(B).  Annual  reductions of less than three percent are authorized 
is the state “demonstrates to the satisfaction of [EPA] that the plan reflecting such lesser amount 
includes all measures that can feasibly be implemented in the area, in light of technological 
achievability.”  Id. § 7511a(c)(1)(B)(ii). 
 76. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511a(b)(2) (reasonably available control technologies), §7511(b)(3) 
(gas vapor recovery), §7511(b)(4) (vehicle inspection and maintenance). 
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increases.77  The 1990 amendments mandated “automatic” sanctions in the 
event states failed to submit SIPs or to rectify SIPs that EPA had 
disapproved.78 
To assure that the plans for emissions reductions actually have the desired 
effect, and hold the states accountable for any shortfalls, Congress introduced a 
“milestones” program.  Areas (except marginal and moderate areas) that are 
subject to emissions reduction targets are required to determine at three-year 
intervals whether the reductions have, in fact, occurred, and to submit to EPA a 
demonstration to that effect.79  The milestones programs is premised on the 
axiom that “what gets counted, gets done,” and attempts to put in place a set of 
clear obligations and provisions to ensure accountability.80  If a state fails to 
submit a compliance demonstration or if emissions reductions fail to meet the 
target, the affected State must elect to have the area reclassified to the next 
higher classification (which subjects the area to additional control 
requirements), implement control measures selected by EPA and determined 
by EPA to be adequate to achieve the next milestone, or adopt an economic 
incentive program.81  If the state fails to make such an election, the area is 
reclassified, or “bumped up,” “by operation of law.”82 “The hope was that the 
milestone process would enable EPA and the states to isolate areas that were 
not progressing swiftly enough toward the statutory goals and to remedy the 
implementation problems in those areas.”83 
Congress also made provision for areas that failed to attain the ozone 
NAAQS by the applicable deadline.  Rather than investing EPA with 
discretionary authority to establish for these areas a new attainment date and 
“reasonable further progress” requirements for SIPs,84 Congress included 
automatic mechanisms.  The Act directs EPA to determine within six months 
following an area’s attainment date whether the area attained the NAAQS.85  
Except for areas classified as “severe” or “extreme,” a determination of 
 
 77. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(a) (marginal area requirements), with id. §7511a(c) (serious 
area requirements). 
 78. See Virginia v. United States, 74 F.3d 517, 520-21 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing 
sanctions); NRDC, 57 F.3d at 1123-24 (same). 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(g). 
 80. See McGarity, supra note 58, at 43, 53-54, 99.  For a discussion and endorsement of a 
system of regulation incorporating “milestones,” see National Academy of Public Administration, 
The Environmental Protection System in Transition Toward a More Desirable Future, Final 
Report of the Enterprise for the Environment, 12-18 (1996). 
 81. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(g)(3). 
 82. Id. 
 83. McGarity, supra note 58, at 43. 
 84. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7509(d) (general provision detailing consequences of failure to 
attain). 
 85. 42 U.S.C. § 7511(b)(2)(A). 
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nonattainment has the consequence that the nonattaining area is reclassified, or 
“bumped up” to a higher classification “by operation of law.”86  
Reclassification has the effect of establishing a new attainment date (i.e., the 
attainment applicable to the higher classification) and imposing specific, 
additional SIP revision obligations on the affected state (i.e., the control 
requirements applicable to the higher classification).87  For severe and extreme 
areas, the statute specifies in detail the sanctions and additional SIP obligations 
that apply in the event of failure to attain by the statutory deadline.88 
Experience to date suggests that the innovative mechanisms of the 1990 
amendments have either not been implemented or have not been effective in 
ensuring that the states make genuine progress toward attainment.  Important 
components of the milestones program have essentially been abandoned by 
EPA.89  Writing in 1999, Professor McGarity noted: 
[T]he milestone program failed because the states were once again not held 
accountable for empty promises and overly optimistic projections in their rate-
of-progress SIPs. . . .  Congress went to great lengths to provide an 
accountability vehicle in the 1990 amendments by requiring states to 
demonstrate after-the-fact that the milestones had been achieved and by 
meticulously specifying the consequences of state failure to make adequate 
rate-of-progress demonstrations.  The EPA, no doubt in tacit collusion with the 
states, completely undermined this arrangement by failing to promulgate 
regulations specifying how states should go about making such demonstrations 
and by adopting the position that no such demonstrations were required until 
the EPA promulgated such regulations.90 
Widespread failure on the part of states to submit SIPs within the time 
frames mandated by the 1990 amendments, like the failure to comply with the 
milestones program, has not been met with the “automatic” consequences 
Congress intended to put in place.  Under the 1990 amendments, there are 
several events that serve to trigger the possibility of sanctions.91  These triggers 
start a “sanctions clock,” which gives the offending state eighteen months to 
correct the deficiency or face “mandatory” sanctions.92  A restrictive 
interpretation of how the sanctions clock operates has taken much of the sting 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(i); see also State Implementation Plans; General Preamble for the 
Implementation of Title I of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 57 Fed. Reg. 13498, 13506 
(April 18, 1992). 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 7511(b)(4). 
 89. McGarity, supra note 58, at 84-89. 
 90. Id. at 97. 
 91. See 42 U.S.C. § 179 (a).  The statutory triggers are: (1) an EPA finding that a state has 
failed to submit a required SIP; (2) an EPA disapproval of a submitted SIP; (3) an EPA finding 
that an approved SIP is not being implemented.  Id. 
 92. See Natural Resources Defense Council, 57 F.3d at 1123-24. 
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of sanctions out of the implementation of the 1990 amendments.93  But EPA 
has been extraordinarily reluctant to take the actions that would even trigger 
the possibility of sanctions. 
A “real-life” example illustrates this reluctance.  Under the 1990 
amendments, “moderate” ozone nonattainment areas were required to submit a 
rate of progress plan providing for specified reductions of VOC emissions.94  
The deadline for making this submission was November 15, 1993.95  The state 
of Missouri submitted its first rate of progress plan for the St. Louis ozone 
nonattainment area in November 1993, but in January 1994, EPA found that 
the SIP was incomplete, triggering the sanctions clock.96  Missouri submitted 
another rate of progress SIP in January 1995, supplemented by submissions in 
March and July of 1995; EPA managed to find the submission “complete,” 
stopping the sanctions clock, just one day prior to the date on which the 
mandatory sanctions were to be put in place.97  In March 1996, EPA proposed 
a “limited approval and limited disapproval” of the state’s rate of progress 
plan.  The primary reason for disapproving the plan was that the state’s plan 
relied heavily on an enhanced vehicle inspection and maintenance program to 
achieve the required emissions reductions, but in 1995, the Missouri legislature 
had deleted funding for the program from the state’s budget.98 
The proposed “limited disapproval” of the state’s rate of progress plan was 
never finalized by EPA, and thus, the sanctions clock was never restarted, even 
though it was clear that the plan could never be approved until, at the very 
least, the legislature acted to restore funding for the inspection/maintenance 
 
 93. See id. at 1125.  EPA interpreted the Act to permit a state that has failed to submit a 
required SIP or failed to submit a complete SIP to halt the sanctions clock by submitting a 
“complete” SIP, even if the complete SIP is clearly inadequate to meet statutory requirements and 
will be disapproved by EPA.  Thus, a state seeking the maximum period of time to comply with a 
requirement to submit a particular type of SIP revision could first fail to submit anything by the 
statutory deadline.  If EPA were vigilant, six months later the agency would make a finding that 
the state failed to submit the required SIP revision, which would trigger the sanctions clock.  
Eighteen months later, the state could halt the sanctions clock by submitting a “complete,” but 
substantively deficient SIP.  A vigilant EPA would then have twelve months to approve or 
disapprove the SIP.  If EPA disapproves the SIP, a new sanctions clock begins to run and the state 
has another eighteen months to correct the deficiency.  Thus, assuming EPA observes all the 
deadlines governing action on SIPs that the statute places on the agency—an assumption that runs 
counters to empirical reality—a state could effectively stall its obligation to submit an approvable 
SIP for a period of four and one-half years.  The D.C. Circuit sustained EPA’s interpretation of 
the statute.  See id. at 1125-29. 
 94. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(b)(1)(A). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See EPA, Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; State of Missouri, 61 
Fed. Reg. 10968, 10970 (Mar. 18, 1996). 
 97. Id. 
 98. See id. 
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program.  The emissions reductions associated with the rate of progress plan 
were by statute required to be achieved by no later than November 1996.99  As 
a moderate ozone nonattainment area, the St. Louis area’s statutory attainment 
deadline was November 15, 1996.100 But it was not until November 1999 that 
the state of Missouri submitted a revised rate of progress plan,101 which was 
approved by EPA in May 2000.102 
The experience of the St. Louis area with the (virtually non-existent) 
possibility of sanctions is apparently not an isolated experience.  A 1997 
Congressional Research Service report identified only one area of the country 
that was then subject to EPA-imposed sanctions—a small area in East Helena, 
Montana.103 
EPA has similarly resisted the “automatic” consequences associated with 
areas’ failure to attain the ozone NAAQS by the applicable attainment date.  
Of the 90 ozone nonattainment areas originally classified as either a marginal, 
moderate, or serious, forty-five have been re-designated to attainment and are 
considered ozone maintenance areas.104  Of the remaining forty-five ozone 
nonattainment areas whose attainment deadlines have now passed—the 
attainment date for highest category considered here, “serious areas,” was 
November 15, 1999105—only four have been reclassified, or “bumped up.”106  
 
 99. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(b)(1)(A). 
 100. 42 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1) (table of attainment dates). 
 101. See 65 Fed. Reg. 8083, 8084 (Feb. 17, 2000). 
 102. Id.  The revised plan itself does not mandate a 15 percent reduction of VOCs from 1990 
baseline levels, because it fails to account for any growth in emissions in the nonattainment area 
between 1996 and the date on which all the control measures in the plan will be implemented.  
EPA’s approval of the plan was challenged on this basis, but the Eighth Circuit concluded that 
EPA’s conclusion that the statute merely required an accounting for growth up to 1996 was 
entitled to Chevron deference. Sierra Club v. EPA, No. 00-2744, slip op. at 8 (8th Cir., June 6, 
2001). 
 103. See Congressional Research Service, Highway Fund Sanctions for Clean Air Act 
Violations, Report No. 97-959 ENR, available at http://www.cnie.org/nle/trans-9html (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2001). 
 104. The numbers presented in the text were generated by analyzing information reported in 
EPA’s “Green Book.”  See, e.g., at http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/greenbk/oinex.html (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2001). 
 105. See 42 U.S.C. § 181(a) (Table of attainment deadlines). 
 106. See 63 Fed. Reg. 8128 (Feb.18, 1998) (Dallas-Fort Worth reclassified from moderate to 
serious); 62 Fed. Reg. 65025 (Dec. 10, 1997) (Santa Barbara reclassified from moderate to 
serious); 62 Fed. Reg.  60001 (Nov. 6, 1997) (Phoenix reclassified from moderate to serious); 59 
Fed. Reg. 50848 (Oct. 06, 1994) (Poughkeepsie reclassified from marginal to moderate).  See 
also EPA, Green Book, Federal Register Notices Related to Ozone Designations and 
Classifications, at http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/greenbk/ofrnrptl.html (last visited Mar. 1, 
2001).  EPA has also proposed rules that reclassify the Louisville and Beaumont-Port Arthur 
ozone nonattainment areas, both of which were originally classified as moderate areas.  See 64 
Fed. Reg.  27734 (May 21, 1999) (Louisville); 64 Fed. Reg. 18864 (Apr. 16, 1999) (Beaumont-
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For the remaining areas, it appears that the statutory requirement that EPA 
determine whether attainment was reached within six months of the applicable 
attainment date, with reclassification “by operation of law” for those areas that 
failed to attain,107 has simply been forgotten, ignored, or otherwise avoided. 
Within this large group of areas that EPA has not reclassified or re-
designated as attainment areas, several may be affected by an EPA policy that 
grants extensions of statutory attainment dates if an area can show that its 
ability to attain the ozone NAAQS was impaired by ozone transport—the 
movement of ozone or ozone precursors from sources in an “upwind area” into 
another “downwind area”).  For a few areas that may qualify for this sort of 
non-statutory extension, EPA has prevented areas from being “reclassified by 
operation of law” by deferring action relating to determinations of whether the 
areas attained the NAAQS by their previously applicable attainment dates.108 
Aside from their questionable legality,109 EPA’s practices of apparently 
just ignoring the requirement to determine whether areas attained and of 
liberally granting extensions on the basis of ozone transport, has undermined 
Congress’s efforts to introduce accountability and to create incentives for state 
compliance.  In its initial iterations, the ozone transport extension policy placed 
several important restrictions on its availability.  In addition to making a 
demonstration that the area was affected by ozone transport, the sources of 
transport had to be located in an ozone nonattainment area with an attainment 
 
Port Arthur).  The St. Louis ozone nonattainment area has been bumped up, but EPA has 
proposed to stay the effective date of this action in order to permit the agency to consider whether 
the area is entitled to an extension of its 1996 attainment date. The agency proposes to withdraw 
the reclassification if an extension is deemed appropriate.  See 66 Fed. Reg. 15591 (Mar. 19, 
2001). Similar proposals have been made for the Louisville and Beaumont-Port Arthur 
nonattainment areas, although for these areas EPA has not yet issued a final rule. 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 7511(b)(2)(A). 
 108. EPA has proposed to extend attainment deadlines for the following areas under its ozone 
transport policy: Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas, see 64 Fed. Reg. 18864 (Apr. 16, 1999); 
Louisville, Kentucky, see 64 Fed. Reg, 27734 (May 21, 1999); St. Louis, Missouri, see 64 Fed. 
Reg. 13384 (March 18, 1999); Springfield, Massachusetts, 66 Fed. Reg. 666 (Jan. 3, 2001); 
Washington, D.C., 66 Fed. Reg. 586 (Jan. 3, 2001); and Greater Connecticut, 66 Fed. Reg. 634 
(Jan. 3, 2001).  The Washington, Springfield, and Connecticut extensions are being challenged in 
the D.C. Circuit.  See Sierra Club v. EPA, No. 01-1070 (D.C. Cir.).  In January 2001, a federal 
district court ordered EPA to finalize its rulemaking concerning whether the St. Louis area 
attained the ozone standard by 1996.  Sierra Club v. Whitman, No.  98-2733 (CKK), 
Memorandum Opinion and Order D.D.C. Jan. 28, 2001).  EPA’s response to the court order is 
found in two rulemakings.  See 66 Fed. Reg. 15578 (Mar. 19, 2001); 66 Fed. Reg. 15591 (Mar. 
19, 2001).  In the interest of full disclosure, the author represents the plaintiffs in ongoing 
litigation against EPA concerning the St. Louis area. 
 109. The statute does not authorize extensions for reasons of ozone transport.  The statute 
permits extensions under very limited circumstances, and only for a maximum of two years.  See 
42 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(5). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT 95 
 
date that extended beyond the attainment date of the affected, downwind 
area.110  The apparent rationale for this limitation was that the upwind state 
was entitled to take advantage of the full length of its applicable attainment 
period and should not be forced prematurely to implement control measures 
not otherwise specifically required under the milestones program.111  
Presumably, and in contrast, a downwind area with the same (or longer) 
attainment period than the upwind area could properly insist that the upwind 
state implement controls to mitigate ozone transport sufficiently to permit both 
areas to meet their attainment deadlines. 
A second important restriction on an area’s ability to secure an extension 
due to ozone transport was that the area had to demonstrate that all the 
requirements associated with the area’s classification had been adopted and 
implemented.112  Thus, while the extension relieved the area of its 
responsibilities to demonstrate attainment through local control measures alone 
and to attain the NAAQS by the applicable statutory deadline, it did not relieve 
the affected state of its responsibility to adopt and implement the control 
measures specified for its applicable classification. 
These limitations have now been largely abandoned, apparently due to 
EPA’s decision to implement a regional solution to ozone transport in the form 
of a massive “SIP call,”113 which requires several states to reduce emissions of 
ozone precursors that contribute to nonattainment in other states.114  Of the 
 
 110. See Memorandum from Mary D. Nichols to Regional EPA Offices, Ozone 
Nonattainment Dates for Areas Affected by Overwhelming Transport, attachment, at 1 (Aug. 30, 
1994), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/tlpgm.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2001) (“The 
attainment date may not be extended beyond the attainment date for the responsible upwind 
area.”).  
 111. See id., attachment, at 6 (arguing that Congress did not intend for an upwind area’s 
“obligation to prevent contribution to other nonattainment areas to supersede the practicable 
attainment deadline and graduated control scheme”). 
 112. Id., attachment, at 2. 
 113. See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone 
Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 
Fed. Reg. 57356 (1998). 
 114. See Extension of Attainment Dates for Downwind Transport Areas, 64 Fed. Reg. 14441, 
14443 (Mar. 25, 1999) (no longer requiring that upwind area in another state have later attainment 
date and not requiring area seeking extension to implement otherwise applicable requirements 
until “no later than the date by which the upwind reductions needed for attainment will be 
achieved”).  Under this approach, for example, a moderate area would not need to implement the 
control measures in its rate of progress plan, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(b)(1)(A), until 
years past the statutory requirement that such measures be implemented and the emissions 
reductions achieved “within 6 years after November 15, 1990.”  Id.  In effect, EPA’s extension 
policy grants areas extensions not only of their attainment dates but also of their obligations to 
demonstrate progress toward attainment by achieving the specific emissions reductions spelled 
out in the statute. 
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areas for which EPA has proposed or granted an extension due to ozone 
transport, none had fully implemented the applicable rate of progress control 
requirements prior to the area’s statutory attainment date.115  None was 
affected by ozone transport from an area with a higher classification; indeed, 
some were affected by ozone transport from areas with lower classifications. 
EPA’s explanation for abandoning the statutory deadlines governing 
implementation of rate of progress control measures is somewhat astonishing.  
The agency concluded that “requiring all local reductions to be implemented 
prior to the time that upwind reductions are achieved would not accelerate 
attainment,” and for that reason, need not be implemented prior to the upwind 
reductions.116  When one commenter suggested that the control measures 
would provide public health benefits prior to attainment, EPA responded that 
none of the areas granted extensions “have delayed or postponed the 
effectiveness of measures because their attainment date is being extended.”117  
The idea seems to be that the only measure of a control measure’s 
effectiveness is its ability to yield “attainment.”  But this stands the rate of 
progress plans and milestone requirements on their head.  The point of these 
control measures is to make progress toward attainment and to reduce peak 
ozone concentrations as expeditiously as possible, even if the reductions are 
not enough to reach attainment. 
C. Slippage and the Critique of Uniform Federal Air Quality Standards 
In light of the experience with the NAAQS under both the 1977 and 1998 
amendments, criticisms of the NAAQS on the basis of their “uniformity” and, 
to a lesser extent, their stringency fail to join theory with practice.  My brief 
review of the manner in which the Clean Air Act has been implemented 
confirms Professor Farber’s conclusion that, “often, the supposed uniform 
standards are both incomplete and under-enforced, with much state variation 
the inevitable result.”118  Indeed, the extent of slippage between statutory 
requirements and actual state obligations is so extensive and continuing that it 
is virtually meaningless to speak of the efficiency losses associated with the 
implementation of uniform standards.  Moreover, the extent of slippage seems 
to be more or less tailored to the particular circumstances of particular states 
and localities, as with the extension policy for areas affected by ozone 
transport.  Accordingly, it is difficult to assess to what extent federal standards 
have forced states to make improvements in environmental quality that they 
 
 115. See sources cited supra note 108. 
 116. 66 Fed. Reg. at 676. 
 117. Id. at 677 (Springfield extensions rulemaking); see 66 Fed. Reg. at 599 (Washington, 
D.C., extension rulemaking); 66 Fed. Reg. at 645 (Connecticut extension rulemaking). 
 118. Farber, supra note 20, at 317. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT 97 
 
would not otherwise independently pursue.  It is certain, however, that the 
inefficiencies supposedly inflicted by the NAAQSs are not by virtue of their 
uniformity, which is typically the only, or most significant, basis for criticism 
invoked by scholars inspired by economism. 
II. WHY FEDERAL AIR QUALITY STANDARDS? 
Because federal air quality standards are uniform neither in form nor 
practice, much of the economics-inspired criticism of the NAAQS is a bit of a 
sport, at least to the extent that it is based on the simple assertion that federal 
air quality standards utterly disregard variations in the respective costs of 
pollution and pollution control throughout the nation.  Nonetheless, it is hardly 
satisfying to justify the NAAQS generally, and the ozone NAAQS in 
particular, on the ground that they accomplish or approach a desired result 
through indirection.  Indeed, to this point, it has been assumed implicitly (or at 
least not disputed) that critics of federal regulation are right in asserting that 
the normatively appropriate unit for analysis is the state: The structure of 
aggregated citizens’ preferences within the respective states, not the nation as a 
whole, should determine appropriate levels of environmental quality.  If this 
assumption is deemed appropriate, then it makes little sense to defend federal 
standards on the ground that they do not depart significantly from the choices 
the citizens of the respective states would otherwise make for themselves. 
Nonetheless, federal standards may be justified along two general lines of 
argument.  First, assuming that the states are presumptively appropriate 
jurisdictions for regulating environmental quality, a number of factors may 
frustrate state efforts to establish and enforce regulatory choices that reflect the 
preferences of state residents.  Second, the assumption that environmental 
quality is a “local” good, rather than a “national” good can be challenged on 
various grounds.  In this section I examine these two, independent forms of 
justification for federal air quality standards.  I conclude that treating air 
quality as a national good, subject to federal minimum standards is a 
normatively more attractive approach than treating air quality as merely a 
“local” good. 
A. Obstacles to Effective Environmental Regulation By States May Justify 
Federal Standards 
Consistent with the assumption that states are the preferred jurisdictional 
unit for purposes of environmental policy, federal standards may nonetheless 
be warranted on economic grounds.  There are four widely recognized 
problems that may prevent states from establishing and enforcing 
environmental standards that mirror the aggregated preferences of their 
citizens.  These problems are: (1) environmental conditions that do not match 
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up with any particular state’s geographic jurisdiction; (2) scientific and 
technical issues; (3) race-to-the-bottom dynamics; and (4) public choice 
problems. 
1. Environmental Conditions That May Frustrate State Environmental 
Standards: Interstate Externalities 
In proposing greater reliance on states, critics of federal regulation often 
link the normatively desirable, or “optimal” jurisdiction for regulation to the 
geographical scope of environmental problems.  On this view, if economic 
activity within a particular state affects environmental conditions only in that 
state, the appropriate jurisdictional unit should be the state, not the federal 
government.119  Professors Butler and Macey have dubbed this approach the 
“Matching Principle”: 
The Matching Principle suggests that, in general, the size of the geographic 
area affected by a specific pollution source should determine the appropriate 
governmental level for responding to the pollution. There is no need for the 
regulating jurisdiction to be larger than the regulated activity. In other words, 
when a particular polluting activity is limited to a particular locality or state, 
there is very little justification for federal environmental regulation.120 
The operative assumption of those who advocate less federal 
environmental regulation and greater reliance on states is that the geographic 
reach of most environmental problems more closely matches the geographic 
jurisdiction of states than that of the federal government.  This assumption is 
often just asserted with no supporting empirical data or developed argument.  
Almost all critics of federal environmental regulation acknowledge, however, 
that when pollution crosses state boundaries, state regulation of resident 
pollution sources will not likely yield desired levels of environmental quality, 
 
 119. See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen, Economic and Public-Choice Forces in Federalism, 6 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 921, 926-29 (1998); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New 
Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 
Geo. L.J. 201, 231-32 (1997) (“In a theoretical first-best regime, the impact of all costs and 
benefits of public goods production must be restricted to the providing jurisdiction.”).  See 
generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 113-16 (1965). 
 120. Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 25; see also Esty, supra note 17, at 587 (describing as 
a “structural mismatch” a situation in which “the scope of an environmental harm does not match 
the regulator’s jurisdiction”); Zerbe, supra note 16, at 204: 
The question of the geographical extent of pollution damage is central to the question of 
appropriate jurisdictions for environmental control.  The more geographically widespread 
the damages, the less satisfactory local control would be. 
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at least in states affected by pollution from other states.  Accordingly, federal 
regulation may be desirable.121 
In the presence of interstate pollution externalities, federal regulation is 
necessary to arbitrate disputes among the states about how shared 
environmental resources—e.g., airsheds and waters—are to be used.  Absent 
such regulation, “upwind” (or upstream) states will ignore pollution sent from 
their state to “downwind” (or downstream) states because the upwind state 
bears none of the costs of this pollution and controlling it would reduce the 
benefits the upwind state enjoys from the economic activity that generates the 
pollution.”122 Likewise, in the absence of federal regulation, regulators in states 
affected by pollution sent from other states are powerless to control out-of-
state polluters and will thus be unable to maintain desired levels of 
environmental quality or can do so only by imposing excessive burdens on 
local economic activity. 123  Accordingly, regulatory decisions may be skewed 
in favor of more pollution than would be warranted in the absence of interstate 
pollution. 
In considering the problem of externalities, the matching principle presents 
several puzzles in application.  Most importantly, the reach of environmental 
problems cannot be determined simply by tracing the physical footprint of 
economic activity.  One obvious problem in this respect is that the federal 
government manages as national goods many thousands of acres of land 
located in the states, often because of the desirable environments these lands 
contain.  Economic activity within a state that spills pollution into federally 
managed areas represents another, often significant form of inter-jurisdictional 
externality.124  Conversely, many federal facilities are themselves significant 
sources of pollution, often imposing negative externalities on nearby state 
residents.125  On federal lands and federal facilities, no serious claim to 
 
 121. See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice, supra note 17, at 1215-16, 1226-27 (discussing 
interstate pollution “spillovers”). 
 122. See Revesz, Interstate Externalities, supra note 17, at 2343 (an interstate externality 
arises “because a state that sends pollution to another state obtains the labor and fiscal benefits of 
the economic activity that generates the pollution but does not suffer the full costs of the 
activity,” with the consequence that “an undesirably large amount of pollution will cross state 
lines”). 
 123. See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 
932 (1997). 
 124. For example, the Clean Air Act includes special provisions for protecting visibility and 
“air quality related values” for federal lands.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(d)(2) (protection for air 
quality related values); §§ 7491-7492 (visibility protection); see also EPA, Regional Haze 
Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 35714 (July 1, 1999) (rule to improve visibility in national parks and 
wilderness areas). 
 125. See generally First Kassen, The Inadequacies of Congressional Attempts to Legislate 
Federal Facility Compliance with Environmental Requirements, 54 MD. L. REV. 1475 (1995). 
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exclusive decisional authority about levels of environmental quality can be 
made by the residents of the state in which the federal property is located.  The 
preferences of these residents, while certainly relevant, are entitled to no 
greater consideration than the preferences of all citizens of the nation. 
A second circumstance in which the physical reach of environmental 
problems may be an inappropriate guide for selecting a regulatory jurisdiction 
involves circumstances where the economic effects of state decisions about 
environmental quality do not coincide with the decision’s physical effects.126  
These economic effects may involve negative or positive interstate 
externalities.  Even if no pollution crosses state lines, it may be appropriate to 
consider the preferences of citizens from other states to ensure that resources 
are devoted to their most highly valued uses.127  Citizens may place significant 
value on environmental goods they use in areas other than their state of 
residence—e.g., parks, waterbodies, wilderness area, and endangered 
species.128  Unless these values are considered by state regulators, states may 
fail to devote environmental resources to their most highly valued uses. 
Where effective mechanisms exist for states to charge out-of-state 
residents with some of the costs of providing quality environments—e.g., 
entrance fees or license charges—state regulators could be expected to take 
“foreign” preferences into account in their regulatory decisions.129  For some 
sorts of preferences, however—most controversially, nonuse values including 
“option” and “existence” values130 and the preferences of future 
generations131—the states lack effective cost-bearing mechanisms and the 
relevant preferences will likely be ignored.132 
 
 126. See Zerbe, supra note 16, at 205-05; Esty, supra note 17, at 593-97. 
 127. See Zerbe, supra note 16, at 205 (“[T]he local environment may have and usually will 
have value to nonresidents of the locality, even in the absence of interjurisdictional pollution.”). 
 128. See Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: 
A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 543 (1997) [hereinafter Response to Critics]. 
 129. See Zerbe, supra note16, at 206-07. 
 130. Option values reflect an individual’s willingness-to-pay to preserve an environmental 
resources for future use. [cite] Existence values are the amount an individual would pay to 
preserve an environmental resource wholly aside from any present or future use that individual 
may make of the resource.  A related concept is “bequest” value—the amount an individual 
would be willing to pay to preserve an environmental resource for the use of future generations. 
For discussion, see Douglas R. Williams, Valuing Natural Environments: Compensation, Market 
Norms, and the Idea of Public Goods, 27 CONN. L. REV. 365, 398-407 (1995). 
 131. See Swire, supra note 17, at 99-100. 
 132. Determining the geographic scope of environmental problems raises knotty problems of 
measurement and valuation that cannot adequately be addressed here.  But a simple example will 
highlight the difficulty.  Professors Butler and Macey argue that some non-use values based on 
preferences held by out-of-staters should simply be factored out in considering the question of 
regulatory jurisdiction.  They posit a case in which Oregon residents are “deeply concerned” 
about lax environmental regulation of chemical plants in Louisiana.  See Butler & Macey, supra 
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State regulatory decisions may also fail to yield desirable levels of 
environmental quality, even when there are no inter-jurisdictional externalities.  
Strong local preferences for environmental quality may be overridden by 
 
note 12, at 30.  Professors Butler and Macey assert that the harm to Oregonians can properly be 
ignored because “the local residents in Louisiana, not the Oregon environmentalists, would bear 
all the costs of reducing pollution.”  Id. at 31.  They imply that the harm experienced by 
Oregonians is not an externality at all, asserting that “[a]llocation of regulatory authority over 
local externalities to local governments allows decisions to be made by the representatives of 
citizens who benefit the most from and the pay the most for higher environmental quality.”  Id. 
  There are three nagging problems with this conclusion.  First, we may assume that the 
concerned Oregonians are willing to pay something (maybe not much) to achieve stricter 
regulation in Louisiana.  If willingness-to-pay is the proper indicator of an economic effect, it is 
entirely unclear why some “harms”—such as though experienced by the Oregonians—should be 
deemed externalities and others not.  To make judgments of this sort is to engage in interpersonal 
comparisons of utility, and as Professor, now-Judge Calabresi has observed, “the moment we are 
willing to [do] that . . . we have introduced a nonunanimously held value into the scheme, and its 
open season. . . . [T]here is no reason based in economics or efficiency why some such 
comparisons should be allowed and others excluded.”  Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of 
Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1217 (1991). 
  Second, to the extent that the harm experienced by Oregonians is properly considered an 
“externality,” exclusion of Oregonian preferences on the ground that Oregonians bear none of the 
costs of protecting environmental values in Louisiana confuses allocative efficiency with 
distributive justice.  This is a surprising claim from Professors Butler and Macey, for the question 
of how the costs and benefits of environmental quality are distributed is generally treated by 
economics-inspired scholars like Professors Butler and Macey as different from the question of 
how much environmental quality should be provided.  On the distinction between allocative 
efficiency and distributive effects, see generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW 12-13 (3d ed. 1986). 
  It may seem odd to state that the preferences of Oregonians should be weighed equally 
with the preferences of Louisianans by Louisiana regulators.  And, indeed, it is an odd 
conclusion, for Louisiana regulators are, by definition, representatives only of residents of 
Louisiana.  If state representatives consistently based regulatory decisions on overriding 
preferences of non-Louisianans, it is likely that those representatives would soon find themselves 
out of work, as Louisiana voters make their preferences known at the voting booth.  But viewing 
the issue in this way already assumes away the critical normative issue—namely, determining 
who is entitled to share in the benefits and who may be required to bear the costs of 
environmental protection, and which jurisdiction is the appropriate one to regulate.  If 
environmental quality in Louisiana is viewed as a national good, then no mismatch between those 
holding preferences about environmental quality in Louisiana and the regulatory jurisdiction 
arises. 
  The third problem has to do with who bears the costs of more stringent regulation.  
Tracing how the increased costs of stricter environmental regulation in Louisiana will be 
distributed is tricky.  The costs might be borne entirely by the shareholders of the chemical 
companies facing such costs; they may be borne by the consumers of the products marketed by 
the affected firms; or they may be borne by the firms’ employees in the form of lower 
compensation.  In some cases, (as with shareholders and consumers), most of the costs might be 
borne by citizens of states other than Louisiana. 
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contrary aggregate state-wide preferences.  Professor Esty has described this 
situation as one involving “internalities”—mismatches between the regulating 
jurisdiction and the environmental problem that arise “[w]hen the jurisdiction 
is broader than the scope of the public good in question.”133  He offers the 
example of a local population that wishes to build a park and is willing to bear 
the costs of doing so, but is frustrated by a jurisdiction-wide referendum that 
rejects the park proposal.134  Where such internalities are present, state 
regulation may be subject to the same sorts of criticism that advocates of state 
regulation currently raise against federal regulation—namely, that it ignores 
variations in the costs of pollution and pollution control from locality to 
locality within a state. 
For air quality standards, the factors discussed above may frustrate state 
efforts to make trade-offs between environmental quality and economic 
activity.  Most significantly, air pollution may generate significant inter-
jurisdictional externalities.  Many air pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide, 
nitrogen oxides, and ozone and its precursors, travel long distances, 
contributing to environmental degradation in states other than the state of 
origin.135  The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments addressed the problem of 
interstate acid deposition by creating an innovative “cap and trade” program, 
employing marketable permits, to reduce aggregate emissions of acid-forming 
pollutants.136  And EPA has finally acted to reduce interstate transport of ozone 
precursors through a demand for amendments to a large number of state 
implementation plans.137  Some air pollution problems, such as global climate 
change and stratospheric ozone depletion, clearly transcend even national 
 
 133. Esty, supra note 17, at 588. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Professors Butler and Macey argue that “smog and local air pollution are local 
problems.”  Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 54.  They do not, however, cite any empirical 
support for this assertion, which is plainly erroneous.  It is now well known that smog is a 
regional air quality problem caused by interstate transport of pollutants.  See generally OZONE 
TRANSPORT ASSESSMENT GROUP, FINAL REPORT, at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/rto/otag/finalrpt/ 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2001). 
 136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o.  See generally Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The 
Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. 
& ECON. 37 (1998). 
 137. See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone 
Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 
Fed. Reg.  57,356 (1998) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75, 96 (2000)).  Information on this 
program and related programs can be found on the web at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/ 
progsregs/noxview.html (last visited June 6, 2001); see also Patricia Ross McCubbin, Michigan 
v. EPA, Interstate Ozone Pollution and EPA’s “NOx SIP Call,” 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 45 
(2001). 
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boundaries.138  Protection of air quality in federal lands also may place 
significant constraints on a state’s ability to choose air quality standards that 
permit more pollution than is currently allowed under the federal ambient 
standards.139 
Under these conditions, federal regulation of air quality is warranted.140  
Yet the form of federal regulation remains controversial.  Many supporters of 
state regulation argue that, in circumstances where it is warranted, federal 
regulation should displace state preferences as little as possible.141  This view, 
however, is inconsistent with the notion that the size of the pollution problem 
should determine the appropriate regulatory jurisdiction.  Where air resources 
are essentially shared among residents of two or more states, arguments for 
respecting divergent state preferences about the use of the resource make sense 
only if something other than the matching principle is at work.  Indeed, where 
resources are shared, as Ronald Coase famously demonstrated, the problem is 
not one of “spillovers,” but of incompatible uses.142  In such circumstances, the 
most difficult questions are likely not to concern appropriate levels of 
environmental quality—although this question will obviously remain 
essential—but rather, how the costs of reducing pollution are distributed to 
achieve a welfare maximizing result. 
Consider, for example, a circumstance in which two states, A and B, share 
an air resource.  For simplicity, assume that there are only two sources of 
pollution—SA, (located in state A), and SB (located in state B)—and only one 
pollutant—pollutant X.  Assume further that both sources, if unregulated, 
would make the following contributions to ambient levels of X in states A and 
B (expressed as parts of pollution per million parts of air (ppm)): 
 
 
 138. See generally Framework Convention on Climate Change, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992); 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987). 
 139. See generally Craig Oren The Protection of Parklands from Air Pollution: A Look at 
Current Policy, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (1989). 
 140. Professor Revesz explains why, absent federal regulation, states would not likely be able 
to resolve disputes among themselves about interstate air pollution in an effective or efficient 
manner.  See Revesz, Interstate Externalities, supra note 17, at 2375 &  n.123; see also Stewart, 
Pyramids of Sacrifice, supra note 17, at 1216 (1977). 
 141. See Butler & Macey, supra note 12, at 36-37, 42. 
 142. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see also 
STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 7 (4th ed. 1999) 
(noting that “Coase’s suggestion, now widely accepted within economics, is that the harmful 
effects of pollution should not be seen as externalities “ but rather as “result[ing] from a large 
number of acts and omissions on both sides”). 
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SOURCE CONTRIBUTION TO 
AMBIENT X 
POLLUTION IN 
STATE A 
CONTRIBUTION TO 
AMBIENT X  
POLLUTION IN 
STATE B 
SA 7 ppm 5 ppm 
SB 8 ppm 10 ppm 
Under these simplified assumptions, and absent any regulation, ambient 
levels of X would be 15 ppm in both states. Suppose State A has a taste for air 
of high quality and has chosen to set a standard for X at 8 ppm.  To achieve 
this standard, ambient concentrations of the pollutant will have to be reduced 
by 7 ppm.  State B cares less about air quality, favoring greater economic 
activity, and has selected a standard of 12 ppm.  To achieve this standard, 
ambient concentrations must be reduced by 3 ppm.  In these circumstances, by 
how much should each source be required to reduce its emissions of pollutant 
X? 
Without knowing more about the costs and benefits, no determinate 
conclusion about a welfare-maximizing result can be reached.143  Each state 
might argue that its standard is designed to permit the existing source in its 
jurisdiction to operate without restriction, while preserving a margin for further 
economic growth.  State A would argue that SB should be required to reduce 
its contribution to ambient X in state A entirely, to protect state A’s chosen 
margin for growth.  The same argument could be made by state B with respect 
to SA’s contribution to pollution in state B.  Both might well founder under the 
Supreme Court’s dormant commerce clause jurisprudence, which generally 
prohibits the states from discriminating between in-state and out-of-state 
industries in pursuing environmental objectives.144  Importantly, however, it is 
the federally chosen distribution of pollution reduction requirements that will, 
to a considerable extent, affect the mix of environmental quality and economic 
activity within each state, even if the states retain responsibility for their 
respective ambient standards. 
One possibility for resolving this problem would be the use of marketable 
permits, but this solution may frustrate states’ efforts to achieve a desired mix 
 
 143. For suggestions on appropriate resolutions for interstate pollution, adopting a “golden 
rule” approach, see Merrill, supra note 123. 
 144. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (invalidating 
differential fees for disposal or treatment of out-of-state and in-state hazardous waste); 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (invalidating ban on disposal of out-of-state 
waste).  For a discussion of how dormant commerce clause principles might be invoked to resolve 
interstate air pollution problems, see Revesz, Interstate Externalities, supra note 17, at 2398-
2409. 
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of environment quality and economic activity.  Each state could issue permits 
representing the total amount of pollution it is willing to tolerate.  Each permit 
would allow a source to make a specified contribution to the concentration of a 
pollutant in the ambient air.  The permits then would be freely transferable 
among sources and each source’s pollutant emissions would be restricted to the 
amount specified in the permits each source holds.145  Under this system, most 
of the permits to pollute in state A could end up being held by sources in state 
B, frustrating state A’s attempts to fine tune its environmental standards to 
promote a specified level of economic activity, while permitting state B to 
externalize some of the environmental costs of its greater economic activity.146  
Moreover, it may turn out that controls on sources located in state B sufficient 
to attain the more stringent state A standards could not be fine-tuned in ways 
that would permit full exploitation of state B’s less stringent standards.  In such 
a case, state A has to some extent externalized the costs of its more stringent 
environmental standards to state B. 
Minimum federal ambient standards do not necessarily solve the problem 
of how to distribute the costs of pollution control among sources of interstate 
pollution.  They do, however, minimize opportunities for states to externalize 
the costs of their choices regarding environmental standards. Federal standards 
are also consistent with the view that the jurisdiction with regulatory authority 
ought to be large enough to include all individuals who suffer costs or receive 
benefits from the activity to be regulated. 
 
 145. For a general discussion of marketable permit programs, see Robert W. Hahn & Gordon 
L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16  ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 364-65 
(1989). 
 146. The result stated in the text is analogous to the problem of “hot spots”—the costs of 
pollution are concentrated in a particular area—that can develop from a system of pollution 
control employing marketable permits.  See generally Richard T. Drury et al., Pollution Trading 
and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 231, 251-57, 271-73  (1999) (discussing problem of “hot spots” arising 
from Los Angeles pollution trading program); Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do 
Market-Based  Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 111, 118 (1999) (discussing how market-based mechanisms of pollution control may 
concentrate the costs of pollution unfairly). 
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2. Scientific and Technical Issues: Economies of Scale 
One of the more pressing problems of environmental regulation and policy 
concerns the appropriate response to significant uncertainties about both the 
health and environmental effects of economic activity and the costs and 
benefits of addressing such effects.  The costs of producing data about the 
relative health and environmental risks of various pollutants, the costs of 
reducing pollution, and the benefits likely to be realized from undertaking such 
reductions, when such data is available (and often it is not available), can be 
quite high.  Centralizing these information gathering and disseminating 
functions at the national level may yield significant scale economies.147 
Critics of federal regulation acknowledge that scale economies may 
support a federal role in environmental regulation.  They contend, however, 
that the presence of scale economies merely supports federal production and 
dissemination of the relevant data, not standards-setting functions. 148 On this 
view, the federal government could perform the basic data gathering and 
analysis, exploiting scale economies, while leaving the states free to use the 
data and analysis in making independent policy decisions about whether and 
what extent to regulate identified hazards. 
This response seems sensible, and may in fact yield substantial benefits.  
There are, however, several significant features about environmental 
regulation, information assessment, and policy-making that make this sharp 
distinction between fact-based inquiries (information gathering and 
assessment) and value-based judgments (standards-setting) problematic.  First, 
choices about which environmental hazards to investigate and assess are 
themselves policy choices.149  To a considerable degree, then, vesting 
informational and technical capacities in the federal government necessitates a 
strong federal role in deciding what may be regulated and what may not.150 
Second, the processes of risk assessment and risk-benefit analysis are not 
normatively neutral.  A variety of critical policy issues are internal to these 
processes, blurring the distinction between risk assessment and risk 
 
 147. See Esty, supra note 17, at 613-16 (discussing economies of scale in technical matters); 
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice, supra note 17, at 1212. 
 148. See Revesz, Response to Critics, supra note 128, at  543-44. 
 149. On setting an environmental regulatory “agenda,” see EPA, SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, 
REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
(1990); John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure in 
Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277 (1992). 
 150. Instructive in this respect is the experience of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration’s regulation of toxic exposures in the workplace.  See generally Sidney A. 
Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative 
Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1989). 
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management.151  Thus, the data provided to states will be the product of 
important policy choices.  As a consequence, to truly reflect state judgments of 
the relative value of greater or lesser environmental protection, state standards 
would have to be the product of information gathering processes that are 
themselves normatively endorsed by the state.  This, in turn, would require 
either more finely tuned federal assessment procedures or a decentralized 
approach to risk assessment and risk-benefit analysis.  Either approach would 
defeat any economies of scale that would attend federal assessment processes. 
Third, the process of setting and implementing environmental standards is 
itself enormously resource intensive.  A typical major EPA rulemaking may 
involve years of study, an extended period for public participation, and a 
lengthy and costly process of judicial review.  For example, EPA’s efforts to 
implement a staged ban of asbestos products extended over nearly ten years 
and involved a 45,000-page administrative record.152  In addition, the 
rulemaking prompted congressional hearings and an acrimonious battle 
between the Office of Management and Budget and Congress.  Despite the 
extended efforts of EPA, the asbestos ban was set aside by the Fifth Circuit, 
largely because the court believed that EPA had taken too many shortcuts in 
analyzing the hazards posed by asbestos and the ways in which the associated 
risks might justifiably be managed.153  This process is repeated in most of 
EPA’s important rulemakings, often involving remands to the agency from 
reviewing courts and extended and costly delays in implementation. 
Reliance on state standards would significantly increase aggregate costs of 
implementing those standards.  It can be expected that regulated parties and 
regulatory beneficiaries would demand (and most likely receive) extensive 
participation rights in state standard-setting processes, including opportunities 
to seek judicial review of those standards.  These costs, aggregated over fifty 
or more jurisdictions could reach staggering levels.  Federal standards, by 
contrast, significantly reduce these transaction costs.  It is, of course, an open 
question whether the higher transaction costs associated with state-centered 
regulation would be offset by the cost savings associated with (presumably) 
 
 151. See generally Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995) (describing how “trans-scientific” issues involve mix of science and 
policy); Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON  
REG. 89, 105 (1988) (same); see, e.g., Lester Lave, Benefit Cost Analysis: Do the Benefits Exceed 
the Costs?, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED 104 (Robert Hahn ed., 1996), reproduced in 
BREYER, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND 
CASES 181-82 (4th ed. 1999). 
 152. See PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 458 
(3d ed. 2000). 
 153. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
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more efficient standards.  Nonetheless, a credible case can be made that 
significant economies inhere in federal standards. 
3.  Race-to-the Bottom Dynamics 
A long-voiced justification for federal environmental standards is that they 
prevent states from competing with each other for economic activity by 
relaxing environmental standards and thereby offering lower location costs to 
industry. Such competition is undesirable if it prompts states to select 
suboptimal environmental standards to attract geographically mobile industry. 
Where this undesirable result obtains, competition among the states may 
resemble a prisoners’ dilemma game, resulting in a “race-to-the-bottom.”154 
The race-to-the-bottom rationale for federal environmental regulation has 
been seriously tested in recent years.  Indeed, the scholarly literature has 
divided on the question whether regulatory competition among the states 
would yield a race-to-the-bottom.  Professor Richard Revesz, relying primarily 
on a model developed by Wallace Oates and Robert Schwab,155 has argued that 
“the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis, though influential, lacks a sound 
theoretical basis.”156  On this view, a market in which states compete by 
offering location rights to mobile capital should be viewed no differently than 
a market involving firms selling widgets; regulatory competition will tend 
toward an optimal mix of economic activity and environmental quality.157 
By contrast, a number of scholars have argued that the stringent 
assumptions needed to demonstrate efficiency gains from state regulatory 
competition render these competitive models utterly irrelevant to critical policy 
choices.158  Others have gathered empirical evidence that is suggestive, but not 
conclusive of a race-to-the-bottom.159  Finally, it has been shown in some 
 
 154. See Swire, supra note 17, at 68; Revesz, Race-to-the-Bottom, supra note 22, at 1210; 
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice, supra note 17, at 1211-12. 
 155. See Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among 
Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333 (1988). 
 156. Revesz, Race-to-the-Bottom, supra note 22, at 1244. 
 157. Id. at 1234-35. 
 158. See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note 119 (surveying and criticizing the demanding 
assumptions of models of regulatory competition); Swire, supra note 17, at 94 (concluding that 
the assumptions needed to demonstrate that regulatory competition will yield efficient outcomes 
“are strongly counterfactual” and noting that “[e]nvironmental law is largely defined by the very 
factors that are assumed away in the models”). 
 159. See Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, “Facts Are Stubborn Things”: An Empirical 
Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate Over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental 
Standard-Setting, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55 (1998); Holly M. Hock, Interstate 
Competition for Jobs and Industry Through Laxity of Environmental Regulations: Pennsylvania’s 
Response and the Effects, 7 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 263 (1998); Kirsten H. Engel, State 
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circumstances state regulation may lead to a “race-to-the-top,”160 although 
those circumstances are probably extremely limited.161 
Professor Swire, for example, has noted that the problems most likely to 
frustrate the efficient functioning of regulatory competition—resulting in 
“market failure”—are those that independently support federal environmental 
regulation—namely, “interstate externalities, deep public choice problems, and 
intractable theoretical and practical obstacles to measuring the social utility of 
environmental regulations.”162  Professors Bratton and McCahery pose a more 
fundamental theoretical difficulty for regulatory competition models that 
promise greater efficiency.  They argue that given the incentives faced by state 
regulators, “one cannot assume an entrepreneurial state”—i.e., that states will 
actually be motivated to compete in the manner specified in the regulatory 
competition models.163  A more plausible model would “substitute[] an 
incentive picture in which market competition shares a place with the 
conventional political factors of interest-group influence and voter 
accountability.”164 
It may very well be that any possibility of a race-to-the-bottom could be 
eliminated by simply addressing the problem that creates the resulting market 
failure—if, with Professor Swire, we assume that such market failures provide 
the critical conditions under which a race-to-the-bottom develops.165  Indeed, 
in attacking the race-to-the-bottom rationale for federal regulation, Professor 
Revesz insists that problems such as interstate externalities and public choice 
shortcomings should be kept “analytically distinct” from race-to-the-bottom 
problems.166  Professors Bratton and McCahery have similarly argued that the 
“[t]he race-to-the-bottom concept should be retired because it does not provide 
an effective basis for challenging weak claims for competitive benefits.”167  
Instead, proponents of federal regulation should focus on the weakness in 
claims of benefits associated with regulatory competition among the states. 
To some extent, Professor Revesz’s insistence on keeping race-to-the-
bottom arguments analytically distinct from other problems that may plague 
 
Environmental Standard-SETTING: Is There A “Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 
HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997). 
 160. DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN A 
GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995). 
 161. See Swire, supra note 17, at 80-87. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 119, at 238. 
 164. Id. at 239. 
 165. See Swire, supra note 17, at 95 (noting that “[t]he presence of serious market failures in 
competition among the states undermines any claim that the competition is efficient.”). 
 166. Revesz, Response to Critics, supra note 128, at 546. 
 167. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 119, at 264. 
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state regulation “loads the dice;” if all market failures are simply assumed 
away, efficient outcomes are, by definition, guaranteed.  The more appropriate 
question might be whether, in the presence of market failures like interstate 
externalities, federal regulation that eliminates or reduces states’ abilities to 
compete through environmental regulation yields greater or lesser net benefits 
than more targeted federal responses.  Unfortunately, this question has 
received scant attention and is not likely to be subject to determinate 
resolution. 
Interstate transport of ozone and ozone precursors, as noted above, is likely 
to frustrate efforts by states to establish optimal environmental standards, and 
this market failure could lead to competition among states that yields 
suboptimal levels of ozone.  Federal efforts to correct this specific market 
failure, without imposing minimum federal standards, may be unsuccessful in 
the presence of competition for industry among affected states. 
Given the absence of a consensus on the race-to-the-bottom question, one 
way to imagine the issues is to consider which rule—federal or state 
regulation—should obtain in the face of uncertainty about the welfare effects 
of either rule.  Most proponents of state regulation, assume that since 
competition is presumptively welfare-enhancing, we should favor any rule that 
increases the opportunities for regulatory competition.  On the other hand, 
competition is beneficial only in the absence of significant market failures and 
it is by no means clear that limited federal intervention, targeted to address 
specific sorts of market failure will successfully achieve the desired correction.  
Moreover, devolution to the states represents a significant departure from the 
status quo, and as such, might be thought to require a rather compelling 
justification.  Indeed, federalism debates now have largely devolved into 
arguments about default rules, a point I address below. 
4. Public Choice Issues 
Another widely invoked justification for federal standards is that 
systematic distortions in state political processes will result in undesirably lax 
environmental standards.  Put another way, there is widespread skepticism that 
state regulators will select environmental standards that undervalue 
environmental quality relative to the value placed on environmental quality by 
state residents. 
The chief reasons that states are more likely than the federal government to 
undervalue environmental quality have to do with the differing political 
dynamics as between the states and the federal government.  It is frequently 
noted that, under standard public choice models, one would expect very little 
environmental regulation because the costs of such regulation are generally 
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very concentrated while the benefits are diffuse.168  Thus, the standard public 
choice story is that industry, which generally bears the highest costs of 
environmental regulation, will be able to organize and influence regulatory 
outcomes to a much greater extent than the beneficiaries of environmental 
regulation, each of whom receives relatively small benefits and thus will be 
inclined to free-ride on the efforts of others.169 
If, despite the predictions of public choice theory, there has been steady 
production of environmental regulation by the federal government, one might 
be disposed to dismiss public choice arguments leveled against state 
regulation.  On this view, public choice problems at the state level should 
presumptively be no greater than public choice problems at the federal level.170  
Nonetheless, there may be reasons to suspect otherwise.  Professor Swire, for 
example, argues that public choice problems are much more likely to result in 
undervaluations of environmental quality at the state level than they are the 
federal level for three reasons.  First, Professor Swire contends that states are 
more likely to seek to externalize the costs of environmental regulation to other 
states and to future generations than the federal government. 171 Second, he 
suggests that the beneficiaries of environmental regulation will find it much 
more difficult to influence state regulators than will industry because of 
information asymmetries and incentives.172  Finally, Professor Swire notes that 
information asymmetries may also lead regulators to favor polluters, who can 
effectively monitor the effects of regulatory decisions, over the public 
generally, which cannot effectively monitor such effects.173 
Another public choice problem that is likely to be greatly more prominent 
at the state level than at the federal level also has to do with the distributive 
impacts of regulatory decisions.  This problem does not involve information 
asymmetries, but rather, involves those cases in which the distributional issues 
are quite salient.  In such circumstances, the decision costs to state regulators 
 
 168. See, e.g., Stewart, National Good, supra note 17, at 199. 
 169. The classic exposition of these collective action problems is MANCUR OLSON, THE 
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).  For more 
recent treatments, see Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 59 (1992). 
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are likely to be quite high, encouraging evasion.  The result may be an 
undesirable bias toward the status quo, neglecting opportunities for welfare 
gains. 
The classic example is the NIMBY, or “not-in-my-backyard,” 
phenomenon.174  A simple illustration shows how, in a NIMBY dynamic, sharp 
distributional issues can frustrate welfare-enhancing moves.  Assume that if a 
state reduces its environmental standards, it will successfully induce a large 
manufacturing facility to locate within the state’s borders.  The manufacturing 
facility will, when fully complying with the state’s reduced environmental 
standards, generate significant amounts of air and water pollution.  The costs 
of this pollution are known to be forty units of welfare.  It is also known that 
pollution from existing sources will increase from the change in standards, 
imposing pollution costs of an additional forty units of welfare. The benefits to 
be gained by the sale of location rights to the facility are known to be 100 units 
of welfare.  The facility seeks to locate in a small, economically prosperous 
town that currently hosts no other significant sources of pollution.  Of the 
benefits gained from the sale of location rights, the citizens of the small town 
will collectively enjoy only twenty units of welfare, with the remaining 80 
units distributed throughout the state.  The small town will, however, suffer 
most of the pollution costs—say, thirty units of welfare.  Finally, we might 
also posit that in relaxing standards for existing sources, benefits from 
increased economic activity will amount to ten units of welfare, distributed 
mostly outside the small town where the new facility seeks to locate.  While 
the sale of location rights is welfare enhancing in the aggregate (a net gain of 
thirty welfare units), the costs and benefits are distributed in ways to create 
sharply concentrated losers and widely dispersed winners.  As the logic of 
collective action suggests, in these circumstances those suffering the 
concentrated costs are more likely to organize and resist the change than are 
the citizens who will enjoy the benefits.  Presumably, however, the sale will go 
forward if, but only if, the citizens can agree on a way to redistribute some of 
the widely dispersed gains to the small town to compensate those who would 
otherwise suffer welfare losses in the form of pollution costs.  More likely, the 
citizens of the small town will succeed in blocking the sale of location rights. 
Even if we assume that the sale would eventually go forward, no economic 
principle warrants an assumption that this resolution could be achieved in ways 
that do not themselves involve significant costs.  Proponents of state regulation 
thus assume away what is perhaps the critical question.  The theory thus makes 
an implausible “no transactions costs” assumption—an assumption I had hoped 
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had banished from serious legal scholarship long ago.175  When the transaction 
costs are very high, it may be that decision makers—including private actors 
seeking to benefit by changes in environmental standards—will simply forego 
desirable changes to avoid such costs. 
The sharp distributional issues sometimes associated with decisions 
regarding environmental quality may also explain why federal regulation may 
be desirable.  Indeed, state regulators might well be inclined to externalize the 
political costs of such decisions by urging federal regulation.  As Professor 
Dwyer notes, “[s]ome [state] officials may think that federal responsibility for 
basic policy decisions will help them to deflect political criticism and 
controversy (‘The Feds made me do it.’).”176  Because federal authorities are 
somewhat more removed from the actual conflict, they do not face the same 
inhibiting structure of political incentives faced by state regulators.  The result 
may be regulation that more closely is aligned with the longer-term “public 
interest” than state regulation would be.177 
B. Jurisdictional Choice in an Imperfect World: Air Quality as a National 
Good 
Many of the proponents of devolution make a number of assumptions that 
are contestable.  Most strikingly, many extol the efficiency gains to be had 
from state, rather than federal, environmental regulation.  They assume that 
some of the worst features (from a utilitarian welfarist perspective) of federal 
environmental regulation—its lack of flexibility and inattention to varying 
costs and benefits—will magically disappear or, at the least, will not be 
exacerbated if environmental regulation is handed to the states wholesale.  The 
foregoing discussion shows why such an assumption should not simply be 
accepted on faith, given the relatively high stakes at issue in environmental 
federalism debates.  Yet, even if one accepts that one or more of the problems 
discussed above—interstate externalities, information costs, market 
imperfections, race-to-the-bottom dynamics, and public choice problems—
would render state regulation less than optimal, it is by no means clear that 
minimum federal standards are the right response.  From a utilitarian welfarist 
perspective, the question appropriately might be phrased in terms of which 
imperfections—those at the state or federal level—pose the greatest threat to 
welfare.178 
 
 175. See generally Calabresi, supra note 132. 
 176. See Dwyer, supra note 45, at 1220 n.177. 
 177. See Sarnoff, supra note 17, at 288 (“Federal regulation may be inherently more 
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sound policy due to factional pressures.”). 
 178. See Swire, supra note 17, at 95. 
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Unfortunately, answers to this question are just as ambiguous as the 
answers to questions about whether and what sorts of “market failures” afflict, 
or are likely to afflict, state and federal regulation, respectively.  In such 
circumstances, jurisdictional choice might be premised on more generalized 
considerations, which support a presumption in favor of either federal or state 
regulation.  This is essentially the conclusion of Professor Revesz.  He 
acknowledges that his “starting point is a rebuttable presumption in favor of 
decentralization,”179 and rests his charges against federal regulation on the 
grounds it lacks substantial justification.  By contrast, Professors Bratton and 
McCahery argue that existing economic models offer no real support for the 
proposition that state regulation will yield efficient outcomes; accordingly, 
proponents of regulatory competition should be required to bear the burden of 
demonstrating that devolution will likely result in efficiency gains over federal 
regulation.180  Bratton and McCahery thus suggest that it is changes from the 
status quo that need justification, not the status quo itself. 
In my view, Bratton and McCahery have the better argument.  While there 
are no doubt some troubling problems with federal environmental regulation, it 
is not at all clear that those problems relate primarily to the choice of media-
quality standards; instead, the greatest inefficiencies of federal regulation more 
likely lie with policy instruments chosen to achieve the standards.181  With 
respect to ozone, the staggering number of citizens who continue to be exposed 
to unhealthy air makes the suggestion that federal standards are too strict 
somewhat implausible. 
The reasons offered by Professor Revesz in support of his presumption 
favoring decentralization are not compelling.  First, he states that because the 
nation is “large and diverse, . . . it is . . . likely that different regions have 
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 180. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 119, at 205. 
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different preferences for environmental protection.”182  Second, Professor 
Revesz notes that “benefits of environmental protection . . . vary throughout 
the country.”183  Third, he notes that the costs of meeting a given standard also 
differ across geographic regions.”184  For these reasons, he believes that state 
regulation is more likely than federal regulation to reflect the varying 
preferences of citizens.185 
In respect to the diversity of preferences point, the notion that “regions” 
have diverse preferences for environmental quality is a confusing one and 
tends to obscure the relevant inquiry.  Individual citizens, not regions, have 
preferences about environmental quality and it is these preferences that, from a 
utilitarian welfarist perspective, should control.  Professor Revesz’s point is 
that aggregated preferences will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as will 
the collective decisions about environmental quality.  He assumes that 
collective decisions will more likely reflect the diversity of preferences as the 
size of the jurisdiction decreases.  Additionally, however, for Professor 
Revesz’s diversity point to support the notion that state decisions about 
environmental quality are more likely to reflect differences in preferences 
across the nation, citizens’ preferences must become relatively more 
homogeneous at the state level than they are at the federal level.  By contrast, if 
citizens’ preferences for environmental quality vary within states as much and 
in relatively the same proportions as they do across states, it cannot be 
assumed that state decisions will be significantly more efficient than will 
national decisions. 
The assumption that citizens’ preferences are relatively more homogenous 
at the state level than they are at the national level is unwarranted for many, 
perhaps most, states.  Some states are also quite large, with populations 
holding a diverse range of environmental preferences.  Indeed, there may well 
be as much variation in preferences among citizens within the respective states 
as there are among citizens within the nation as a whole.  In these 
circumstances, one cannot merely assume that vesting decisional authority in 
the states will yield a regulatory regime that is more responsive to the diverse 
preferences of the citizenry than a national regulatory program of minimum 
environmental standards.  Even if some states would arrive at collective 
decisions about air quality that are significantly less stringent than the current 
minimum federal standards, the number of states reaching such a conclusion is 
likely to be very small.  As a result, any gains to be had from a closer match 
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between standards and citizens’ preferences might be vastly overwhelmed by 
the transaction costs associated with decentralized decision making. 
The issue of varying benefits and costs likewise raises important empirical 
questions about variances among and within jurisdictions.  The benefits and 
costs of environmental regulation are surely not uniform across any state.  As 
Professor Revesz himself notes, “a stringent ambient standard may benefit 
many people in densely populated areas but only a few elsewhere.”186  
Population density, of course, varies as much within many states as it does 
among states.  Likewise, the costs of meeting a state-wide environmental 
standard are likely to vary quite as much within some states as they do within 
the nation.  If this is right, it seems difficult to conclude that state standards 
will yield significant welfare gains over federal standards, for state standards 
might ignore the differences in costs and benefits to the same extent as federal 
standards. 
Even if the foregoing points are deemed unpersuasive, the presumption in 
favor of state regulation presented by Professor Revesz rests decisively on 
presumed welfare effects and these effects are assessed by a utilitarian cost-
benefit criterion.  The implicit assumption is that, although current federal 
regulation rejects this approach to setting air quality standards, all (or most) 
states would select policy tools that seek to achieve greater efficiency along 
this utilitarian vector.  That is, arguments for devolution premised on the 
desirability of achieving more efficient standards assume that citizens would 
prefer state regulators to make trade-offs between environmental quality and 
economic growth that current federal law prohibits. The basis for this 
assumption is nowhere presented.  The citizens of the nation as a whole have 
chosen to base air quality standards only on health effects, precluding 
consideration of the costs of achieving the selected standards.187  Why should 
one assume that, if disaggregated by state, citizens preferences would be 
distributed in ways that would permit a minority view (nationally)—one in 
which the costs of air quality become a centrally important issue—to emerge 
as a majority view at the state level? Absent a convincing explanation of how 
federal air quality standards are a distortion of citizens’ “real” preferences, the 
more likely conclusion is that citizens would continue to hold the same 
preferences, regardless of whether it is the state or the federal government that 
is doing the regulating.  While there may be some differences among the states 
about what standard is deemed sufficient to protect public health, such 
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differences would not be due to differing preferences, costs, and benefits 
among the various states, and any variation is likely to be rather small.  
Moreover, it is difficult to make any theoretical conclusions about the 
comparative efficiency of diverse “health-based” standards relative to federal 
minimum standards.  Most likely, however, there would be substantial 
economies of scale to be had from federal regulation. 
The overwhelming preferences of citizens appear to favor air quality 
standards based solely on the health effects of pollutants also supports a more 
direct criticism of those who support regulatory competition among the states.  
The concern of citizens is not that air quality standards be “efficient”; citizens 
apparently want an entitlement to healthy air.  To make such an entitlement 
portable, permitting citizens to move freely around the country without fear 
that their “right” will be compromised, national minimum air quality standards 
are an effective option.188 
It may be true that the same citizens who voice a preference for such an 
entitlement may object when the costs of achieving such standards begin to 
have a discernible impact on them.  But, nationally, citizens have largely 
acquiesced in bearing these costs; indeed, a significant majority voice concern 
that air quality standards are not tough enough and that current standards are 
under-enforced.189 
Moreover, efforts to select more efficient standards may founder on the 
limits of current technologies for making credible assessments of the welfare 
effects of varying standards.  The costs and benefits of achieving minimum 
federal air quality standards, particularly in the longer term, are quite 
uncertain, both as an empirical matter and from the perspective of selecting an 
appropriate methodology for assessment.190  Accordingly, when one speaks of 
the costs and benefits of various air quality standards, one is really making an 
educated guess about a number of critically important factors.  To date, 
forward-looking estimates of the costs of achieving environmental standards 
have been notoriously unreliable, and generally have been biased in the 
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direction of vastly overstating the costs.191  If decisions had been based on 
these estimates, the nation would have experienced a severe welfare loss due to 
excessive levels of pollution.  There is no reason to believe that state regulators 
would produce more accurate assessments.  Thus, even if cost-benefit analysis 
provides the “right” method for determining the optimal level of air quality in 
theory, a pragmatic alternative may be to adopt a health-based standard and 
hope for the best.192 
Moreover, to base decisions on health criteria alone, as is mandated by the 
Clean Air Act, is not “irrational” merely because the short-term costs and 
benefits do not yield a conclusion that such standards are “efficient,” even if 
methodological difficulties with cost-benefit analysis could be acceptably 
resolved.  The architects of the Clean Air Act believed, as do perhaps most 
citizens, that, when pressed, polluters will find effective ways to control 
pollutant emissions at reasonable costs.193  Thus, the statute has consistently 
been described as adopting a “technology-forcing” strategy to air quality 
problems.194  Noting that such a strategy can be sensible, Justice Breyer, in 
Whitman v. American Trucking, stated: 
Technology-forcing hopes can prove realistic. Those persons, for example, 
who opposed the 1970 Act’s insistence on a 90% reduction in auto emission 
pollutants, on the ground of excessive cost, saw the development of catalytic 
converter technology that helped achieve substantial reductions without the 
economic catastrophe that some had feared. . . . 
  At the same time, the statute’s technology-forcing objective makes 
regulatory efforts to determine the costs of implementation both less important 
and more difficult. It means that the relevant economic costs are speculative, 
for they include the cost of unknown future technologies. It also means that 
efforts to take costs into account can breed time-consuming and potentially 
unresolvable arguments about the accuracy and significance of cost estimates. 
 
 191. See id. at 600. 
 192. See Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 181, at 302 (noting that health-based standards 
“might make sense on more pragmatic grounds in circumstances in which the policy-making 
entity has relatively good information about the relationship between various levels of exposure 
and resulting harm to health or the environment (i.e., a well-defined dose-response curve), but not 
much information about the costs of employing alternative technological fixes”). 
 193. Whitman, 121 S. Ct. at 922-23 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing technology-forcing 
strategy of the Clean Air Act). 
 194. Id.; see also Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976) (stating that the Clean 
Air Act was “expressly designed to force regulated sources to develop pollution control  [***58] 
devices that might at the time appear to be economically or technologically infeasible.”).  For a 
discussion of the technology-forcing strategy of environmental law, see D. Bruce La Pierre, 
Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771 
(1977). 
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Congress could have thought such efforts not worth the delays and 
uncertainties that would accompany them.195 
If one of the objectives of environmental policy is to reduce “wasteful” 
uses of our natural resources—an objective that economists and others might 
both support with enthusiasm—technology-forcing through health-based 
standards may be an important and appropriate policy choice.  In 
environmental matters, costs and benefits often cannot be meaningfully 
assessed, making it difficult to frame policy choices in terms of marginal 
analysis—i.e., the point at which the benefits of the next increment of 
improvement in environmental quality are equal to the costs of achieving that 
increment.196  Accordingly, “satisficing” rather than “optimizing” solutions are 
called for.197  In the absence of some restriction on pollution-generating 
activities, polluters simply have few incentives to invest in innovation to 
reduce the amount and kinds of pollution that is generated.  With regulation, 
polluters are faced with added costs—costs that profit-maximizing entities will 
seek to reduce.  Greater investment in developing pollution-reducing 
innovations thus becomes a profit-maximizing strategy; such investment may 
drive more rapid technological change that lowers overall costs: 
[R]egulation provides or requires the generation of information; since 
information is a public good it may be underprovided without such 
incentives. . . . [Additionally, r]egulation reduces uncertainty about the payoffs 
to investments in environmental innovation.  There may be potential 
investments that are believed to be profitable in an expected value sense, and 
also deliver environmental benefits, but which are highly risky in the absence 
of regulation that ensures that the environmental benefits are also privately 
valuable.  Regulation, in effect, provides ‘insurance’ against the risk of 
investing in new technology, part of whose benefit cannot be internalized. . . .  
[Moreover] technology that is initially more costly may produce long-run 
competitive advantage, because of learning-by-doing or other “first-mover” 
advantages . . . .  Finally, regulation simply creates pressure.  Such pressure 
plays an important role in the innovation process, “to overcome inertia, foster 
creative thinking and mitigate agency problems.”198 
 
 195. Whitman, 121 S. Ct. at 922-23 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 196. See Swire, supra note 17, at 95-98 (discussing measurement problems). 
 197. On “satisficing,” as distinguished from “optimizing,” see Russell B. Korobkin & 
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption From Law 
and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1075-76 (2000). 
 198. Adam B. Jaffe, et al., “Technological Change and the Environment,” paper prepared as a 
chapter of THE HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS (Karl-Göran Mäler & Jeffrey 
Vincent, eds., forthcoming), pp. 21-26 (quoting M.E. Porter & C. van der Linde, Toward a New 
Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 97, 98 
(1995)), available at Social Science Electronic Research Library, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?cfid=790370&cftoken=39052807&abstract_id=24585 (posted Oct. 13, 2000);  see 
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Minimum federal air quality standards can importantly influence 
incentives for technological innovation.  First, if these standards are backed by 
consistently applied federal sanctions on states that fail to achieve the federal 
standards,199 state regulators have an incentive to devise pollution control 
strategies that achieve the standards while imposing the least net costs on their 
citizens.  In theory, this will encourage states to invest in innovative regulatory 
strategies to a greater extent than they would in the absence of a federal 
mandate.  In this sense, the “cooperative federalism” structure of the original 
Clean Air Act itself can be viewed as an exercise in “technology-forcing” in 
the realm of state regulatory programs.  In the absence of a federal mandate, 
state regulators might conclude too quickly that strict environmental standards 
are infeasible for economic or other reasons.  Admittedly, the current Clean 
Air Act radically restricts this potential by imposing extensive control 
requirements on states with nonattainment areas.200  Arguably, these 
requirements would be unnecessary if federal sanctions were applied 
consistently and aggressively. 
Second, federal standards may minimize the disincentive for innovation 
provided by an state “voice” or “exit” option—i.e., avoiding pollution controls 
through concessions gained from the states or by re-locating to another 
jurisdiction.  While this effect is somewhat speculative, given the states’ 
discretion to distribute the clean-up burden, the general direction of the 
incentive effects created by federal minimum standards would likely tend 
toward greater investment in innovation on the part of regulated firms than 
would occur in the absence of such standards.  Given the uncertain—yet, quite 
remarkable—pace of technological innovation, it is not at all fanciful to 
suggest that the incentives created by minimum national ambient air quality 
standards will eventually make clear that attaining them is not only a bargain, 
but in some circumstances a “win-win” solution.  On this view, “regulation 
may lead to ‘innovation offsets’ that can not only lower the net cost of meeting 
environmental regulations, but can even lead to absolute advantages over 
firms . . . not subject to similar regulations.’”201 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Stewart has recently concluded that, because the American 
public views environmental quality as a “national good,” the usual criticisms 
 
also Alan S. Miller, Environmental Regulation, Technological Innovation, and Technology-
Forcing, NAT. RES. & ENVTL., Fall 1995, at 64. 
 199. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(c) (authorizing federal implementation plan as substitute for 
inadequate state plans); 7410(m) (discretionary sanctions); 7509 (mandatory sanctions). 
 200. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §7511a (plan requirements for ozone nonattainment areas). 
 201. Jaffee et al., supra note 198, at 24 (quoting Porter & C. Van der Linde, at 98 (1995)). 
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of federal environmental regulation advanced by critics who employ “the usual 
assumptions of the welfare economic/optimal environmental jurisdictional 
analysis” are somewhat off-target.202  Instead, given the strong support for the 
current federal regulatory structure on the part of the public, “environmental 
programs should presumptively be federal unless ‘centralization failure’ 
dictates decentralization.”203 
Treating air quality as a national good is consistent with the environmental 
character of many air quality problems, which involve extensive interstate 
pollution.  Even for pollutants that do not travel long distances, many large 
urban areas straddle state lines, making a state-centered approach to air quality 
a terribly inefficient alternative, given the high transactions costs of securing 
agreement between states on appropriate goals for air quality regulation and, 
especially, the manner in which control obligations should be distributed as 
between the states.  In the end, however, the best justification for national 
ambient air quality standards is that the vast majority of citizens have come to 
view the goals represented by such standards as an appropriate constraint on 
our willingness to secure short-term economic advantages at the cost of long-
term environmental health.  Minimum federal air quality standards exude a 
national optimism about our ability to innovate and achieve desirable natural 
environments while enjoying a vibrant, sustainable economy.  While the 
continuing extent of ozone nonattainment casts some doubt on whether such 
technological optimism is warranted, a longer-term perspective may suggest 
otherwise.  In the three decades since the enactment of the 1970 Clean Air Act 
and the decade since the 1990 amendments, much progress has been made.  
The clear motive force of that progress has been a strong federal role.  While 
devolution may be attractive in theory, prudence may warrant a bit more 
patience with federal air quality regulation than the critics have been willing to 
endure. 
 
 
 202. See Stewart, National Good, supra note 17, at 212. 
 203. Id.  at 213. 
